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May 31, 2012
The
consensus that President Obama has a strong foreign-policy record holds
only if one limits this assessment mainly to security matters. Bending History,
a new book by three Brookings authors—Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal
and Michael O’Hanlon—provides a fine opportunity to review this part of
the president’s record during his first three years in office. The
authors are learned, meticulous and grant Obama the benefit of the doubt
whenever possible. But a close reading of the book reveals that Obama
acts as if speechmaking will change the world, often splitting the
difference between conflicting views or buying into someone else’s
strategy.
The authors argue that Obama entered the Oval Office hoping to
rehabilitate America’s international reputation, particularly in the
Muslim world; promote multilateralism and enhance cooperation with
China; end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; engage in dialogue with
Iran and encourage nuclear nonproliferation; establish lasting peace in
the Middle East; forestall climate change; and alleviate global poverty.
However, as the authors note, there has been an “inevitable tension
between [Obama’s] soaring rhetoric and desire to depart fundamentally
from the policies of the Bush administration, on the one hand, and his
instinct for governing pragmatically, on the other.” In trying to
resolve that tension, Obama’s foreign policy has “repeatedly manifested a
combination of the realist’s pragmatic approach to the world as it is
and the idealist’s progressive approach to a new world order that he
seeks to shape.” Overall, they believe he has done “reasonably well” in
terms of protecting American interests; however, when “judged by the
standard of fulfilling his vision of a new global order, [Obama’s
legacy] unsurprisingly remains very much a work in progress.” A generous
statement, as we shall see.
Obama’s slower-than-promised drawdown of troops from Iraq was based,
the authors argue, on the opinions of key military leaders and could be
justified by the need to avoid big reductions in U.S. troops before the
2010 Iraqi elections. Thus, they conclude that Obama’s actions in Iraq
were “careful, thoughtful, and effective.” Actually, the jury is very
much out on Iraq. At the moment, it seems as if the government is shaky,
intergroup violence is considerable, undemocratic tendencies are on the
rise and Iran’s influence is increasing.
Regarding Afghanistan, the authors reject strongly the thesis that
Obama was pushed into a surge by the generals. It must be noted,
however, that Obama’s goal was limited to eradicating Al Qaeda. His
strategy was to engage in counterterrorism by building a stable,
democratic and effective government in that country—in short, nation
building. That strategy is utterly failing. Biden’s version of an “offshore balancing” strategy, which worked well in Libya, would have been much less costly and more effective.
The authors find that “nowhere in Obama’s foreign policy has the gap
been wider between promise and delivery than in the Middle East.” This
evaluation is focused on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, in which the
authors find Obama made numerous tactical mistakes. When combined with
the absence of a strategy, these errors led to a new low in this
admittedly very difficult situation. Before Obama, the authors note, the
sides were at least talking.
Obama has a fairly good track record in dealing with rogue states and
combating nuclear proliferation, claim the authors. He has successfully
rallied the international community against Iran, promoting sanctions
that already have left Iran’s economy “reeling.” It remains to be seen
how effective the sanctions are—and what the administration will do if
they fail.
The authors suffer from the fact that the world did not hold still in
the months that passed between writing and publishing the book. They
view the “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations as a success; however, it did
not last and had few positive spillover effects. START, as I have
pointed out elsewhere,
focused on a low-priority issue while leaving untouched the more
serious threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons. It did not inspire
Pakistan or North Korea to give up, or even slow down, their
accelerating nuclear-arms buildup.
Nowhere is the strategic confusion of the Obama administration more
evident and potentially more damaging than in its treatment of China, a
failing the authors acknowledge, albeit in a temperate way. The Obama
administration on one hand sought to engage China and urged Beijing to
become a responsible stakeholder in maintaining the world order. On the
other hand, it acted aggressively to contain China, pushing India to
“balance” Beijing, engaging in military exercises with its neighbors and
positioning forces on China’s borders. The Chinese also addressed the
West in conflicting voices, some speaking of peaceful development,
others of military buildup. The net result is a growing distrust between
the two powers.
On energy and climate change, the authors categorize Obama’s track
record as disappointing. Two of Obama’s major goals for forestalling
climate change were to institute an international accord at the
Copenhagen conference and to implement domestic “cap and trade”
legislation that would reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 83 percent by the
year 2050. Neither happened. The authors find Obama’s approach to
global poverty—in particular, his promise to double foreign aid—to be
“unrealistic.” They question the value of aid altogether, noting that
the economic advancements of the major emerging powers (China, Brazil
and India) have been mainly due to trade and investment. The authors do
credit the Obama administration with reacting quickly and generously to
the earthquake in Haiti.
Bending History highlights how complex and unyielding the
world is, even to a superpower. It remains to be seen whether whoever
leads us next can draw the proper lessons from this valuable study of
U.S. foreign policy. What we have heard so far, from both sides, does
not leave one brimming with optimism.
Amitai Etzioni served as a senior advisor to the Carter White
House; taught at Columbia University, Harvard and The University of
California at Berkeley; and is a university professor and professor of
international relations at The George Washington University.
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-flailing-foreign-policy-6984?page=1http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-flailing-foreign-policy-6984?page=1
