CHIẾN LƯỢC NHIỀU "MŨI GIÁP CÔNG" CỦA TRUNG QUỐC ĐỐI PHÓ VỚI "QUAY TRỞ LẠI CHÂU Á" CỦA MỸ
Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 22
November 30, 2011 01:01 AM Age: 16 days
Category: China Brief,
Willy’s Corner, Elite, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the
Asia-Pacific, Home Page, Featured
Premier Wen Jiabao and President Barack Obama
Relations
between China and the United States have taken a confrontational turn
in the wake of a series of initiatives taken by President Barack Obama
in his recent trip to Hawaii and Asia. While taking part for the first
time in the East Asia Summit in Bali, Obama and his aides reiterated the
U.S. commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea. They stressed that settlement to sovereignty rows in the area must
be in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Obama approved the sale of 24 F16-C/D jetfighters to Indonesia,
which—together with the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and
Taiwan—has disputed China’s claims to the entire South China Sea. During
a stopover in Australia, Obama announced that up to 2,500 marines would
be stationed at Darwin, North Australia. Given that Darwin is a mere
600 miles from the southern tip of the Sea, the move is interpreted as
an effort to boost U.S. ability to intervene in the flashpoint zone.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is scheduled to visit
Burma next month in an apparent effort to improve ties with China’s
long-standing client state. Finally, at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Hawaii, Obama made a big push for the
Transpacific Partnership (TPP), a potential free trade area for some ten
nations that do not include China. All these measures seem to
exacerbate what Beijing perceives as an “anti-China containment policy”
spearheaded by Washington (Washington Post, November 15; Associated Press, November 17; Wall Street Journal, November 18).
The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership has taken multiple steps to
counter the fusillades unleashed by the United States' first “Pacific
President.” At the rhetorical level, commentators in the state media as
well as semi-official academics have warned Washington’s bid to be “back
in Asia” may endanger regional peace and stability in addition to
harming Sino-U.S. relations. In a strongly worded commentary, the Xinhua
News Agency asserted the Obama administration’s maneuvers were geared
toward imposing U.S. leadership in Asia for the self-serving goal of
rendering the 21st century “America’s Pacific century.” “If the United
States sticks to its Cold War mentality and continues to engage with
Asian nations in a self-assertive way, it is doomed to incur repulsion
in the region,” Xinhua warned. The party mouthpiece added that recent
U.S. policies could result in “sparking disputes and encroaching on
others’ interests,” which might in turn jeopardize “the region’s
stability and prosperity” (Xinhua News Agency, November 19; Agence
France-Presse, November 19). According to Renmin University's U.S.
specialist Shi Yinhong, Sino-U.S. relations have entered a “very
important new stage.” “It is very obvious that the United States is
aiming to contain and constrain China,” he said. Tsinghua University
international affairs expert Sun Zhe noted the U.S. gambit in Asia “has
gone from the level of slogans to diplomatic action in a speedy and
effective manner.” He expressed fears that contention between China and
the United States “has gone from under the table to center stage” (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], November 20; Chinadigitaltimes.net, November 19).
Given
the top priority that China has attached to relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc as well as an early
settlement of South China Sea disputes, much of Chinese leaders’
reactions have focused on preventing the United States from “meddling”
in the sensitive area. Upon his arrival in Bali, Premier Wen Jiabao
noted sovereignty conflicts “should be resolved among directly related
sovereign countries through friendly consultation and negotiation in a
peaceful way.” “Powers outside of the region should not interfere under
whatever pretexts,” he added (Xinhua News Agency, November 18; Sina.com,
November 19). Largely owing to Chinese pressure, the Philippines was
unable to raise a motion at Bali calling for the resolution of the South
China Sea issue through an international framework. This was despite
the fact that during a visit to Manila last week, Secretary Clinton
vowed to provide “greater support for [the Philippines’] external
defense.” Washington also gave the Philippine defense forces another
coast-guard vessel. “We
are strongly of the opinion that [the dispute that] exists primarily in
the West Philippines Sea between the Philippines and China should be
resolved peacefully,” she said, using the Philippine term for the South
China Sea (Voice of America, November 17; Philippine Star [Manila], November 19).
Beyond
rhetoric, Beijing has adopted a multi-pronged approach to blunt Obama’s
diplomatic offensive. The first is to reassure ASEAN members that
Beijing harbors no hegemonic intentions and that it is willing to abide
by the “rules of the game” arrived at with other sovereignty claimants.
In his Bali speech, Premier Wen reiterated China’s commitment to the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which Beijing
concluded with ASEAN in 2002. The DOC was a non-binding set of pledges
regarding safety of navigation and the peaceful use of the waters. “We
hope relevant parties would take into concern the overall situation of
regional peace and stability, and do something more conducive to mutual
trust and cooperation,” Wen said. He added Beijing would continue to
stick to the principle of “friendly negotiation and consultation in a
peaceful way” to resolve South China Sea issues (China News Agency,
November 19; China Daily, November 19). Chinese officials however
have reiterated Beijing’s insistence on bilateral talks with individual
claimants—and not a China-ASEAN dialogue—to settle sovereignty rows.
Most ASEAN claimants are convinced that a multilateral approach,
possibly involving outside parties including the United States, would
strengthen their negotiation positions via-a-vis China.
Secondly,
Beijing is wielding the time-tested “economics card” to gain the good
will of ASEAN members, especially claimants to the South China Sea.
Wen’s speech at the Bali summit emphasized the win-win scenarios of
enhanced business ties with ASEAN under the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
and other regional arrangements. He put forward a five-point proposal
for boosting the regional economy, which included mutual investments,
technological transfers and improvement of intra-regional
infrastructure. “The Chinese side is willing to enthusiastically expand
its investment in ASEAN countries, enhance the transfer of advanced and
suitable technology and to jointly raise [our] industrial
competitiveness,” Wen said. According to Zhang Weiwei, a strategist at
the semi-official Chunqiu Composite Research Institute, Beijing should
boost its overseas development aid program, including a possible
“Southeast Asian version of the Marshall Plan.” Professor Zhang added
this would not only improve China’s economic and political ties with
Asian countries but also minimize the damages that the TPP might do to
China (Xinhua News Agency, November 19; Global Times, November 17).
Indeed,
enhancement of economic cooperation under the China-ASEAN FTA has the
additional benefit of parrying the threat posed by the TPP, which is
viewed by Chinese officials and scholars as a plot by Washington to
“exclude” China from a potentially lucrative regional trading
arrangement. According to Renmin University politics professor Peng
Zhongying, the TPP is but a ploy with which “[a United States] that is
in economic decline tries to pry open the markets of economically
prosperous Asia-Pacific nations.” While American officials have
indicated China is in theory able to apply for membership, TPP criteria
relating to minimal state interference in the market as well as high
labor standards would seem to militate against Chinese participation.
Among ASEAN members, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam have
expressed an interest in joining TPP. Other aspiring members include
Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Canada, Mexico and Japan.
(Washington Post, November 13; Global Times, November 19; Mainichi Daily [Tokyo] November 13).
While
gunning to win the hearts and minds—or at least the wallets—of the
majority of Asia-Pacific countries, Beijing is poised to use the
time-honored tactic of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” (sha ji xia hou)so as to penalize “troublemakers” such as the Philippines and Vietnam. The strategy was laid out in an editorial of the Global Times
titled “Cold-shoulder the Philippines: let it pay the price.” The
provocative state-run tabloid said “In the process of ‘penalizing’ the
Philippines, China must not go overboard, lest the region’s fear of
China increases.” China’s punishment of the Philippines however must be
“forceful,” the editorial added, “so that the Philippines has to pay a
substantial price.” The mass-circulation paper suggested the best way is
to “cold-shoulder the Philippines even as China’s cooperation with the
entire Southeast Asia becomes more entrenched.” According to Renmin
University foreign policy expert Jin Canrong, China should “use
different tactics toward different Southeast Asian countries.” He
proposed imposing economic sanctions on countries such as the
Philippines and Vietnam, “which have made the most noises” against
China. “China can send a message to these countries by decreasing aid to
them or temporarily stopping Chinese tourists from visiting them,”
Professor Jin indicated (Global Times, November 19, November 17; BBC News, November 17).
Beijing’s
potentially most potent weapon to whip ASEAN members into line is its
fast-modernizing navy. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is
developing a blue-water fleet that boosts sophisticated hardware ranging
from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. There have been reports
the past few months that the PLAN will base its fourth fleet—which
eventually may consist of two to three aircraft carrier battle groups—in
Sanya, a city in south Hainan Island. Sanya sits on the northern tip of
the South China Sea. This armada will complement the Qingdao-based
North Sea Fleet, the Ningbo-based East Sea Fleet and the Zhanjiang-based
SouthSea fleet. China’s naval power projection reached a new height
last August with the maiden voyage of its first aircraft carrier, the
Varyag, which was a refitted version of a Ukrainian vessel that China
acquired in the 1990s. PLAN shipyards are believed to be building up to
three Chinese-designed state-of-the-art carriers that could come on
stream in the latter half of this decade (Korea Herald [Seoul] September
9; Business Standard [New Delhi], August 16; China Daily, July 29).
The message that Beijing does not rule out a military solution to the South China Sea imbroglio has been sent via the Global Times,
which is often regarded as a propaganda vehicle for hawkish elements in
the Chinese establishment. In a much-noted commentary in late October, Global Times
warned that aggressive sovereignty claimants to the South China Sea
such as Vietnam and the Philippines should “mentally prepare for the
sound of cannons.” “China should not give pride of place to force and
use the military option as its national policy,” it pointed out. “Yet
China must also not rely solely on negotiations. In times of exigencies,
it should ‘kill one to scare off the hundred’.” More recently, Global Times
ran an article by National Defense University strategist Fan Jinfa that
the authorities should take a pugilistic approach to prevent other
nations from grabbing Chinese territories in the South China Sea.
“Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have occupied territories in the
Spratly Islands,” said Fan, a former naval captain. “We should be more
proactive in order to enhance de facto occupation and control” of islets in the disputed waters (Global Times, November 11, October 25; Reuters, October 25).
Will
Beijing’s game plan work? Much depends on the Obama’s administration’s
ability to gain the support of heavyweight countries in the Asia-Pacific
theatre to participate in its “pivot-on-Asia” strategy. Indeed, much of
the CCP leadership’s nervousness stems from the fact that for the first
time, India and Japan seem to be joining the alleged U.S. attempt to
contain China through “internationalizing” the South China Sea issue.
Indian state oil companies have signed agreements with Hanoi to exploit
oil and gas close to islets that are also claimed by China. Tokyo
recently concluded defense cooperation and intelligence exchange deals
with both Vietnam and the Philippines. At Bali, the Japanese delegation
inked a separate statement with ASEAN regarding ways and means to ensure
unobstructed navigation in the South China Sea. Tokyo also has backed
Manila’s effort to seek an “international solution” to territorial
brawls in the contested waters. Despite problems in the Japanese
economy, Tokyo last week pledged $25 billion in infrastructure-related
aid and loans to ASEAN members (Ming Pao, November 19; Reuters, November 18; China News Service, November 18).
Yu
Zhirong, a researcher at the China Oceanic Development Research
Institute, asked a highly relevant question regarding the country’s
run-in with a host of nations over the South China Sea. “China’s
strength has increased and it should be striking fears [in the hearts of
its neighbors],” he wrote in a recent article. “How come it faces
enemies at the front and back over efforts to protect its maritime
territorial rights?” (Xinhuanet.com, November 9; Sina.com, November 9).
One answer to Yu’s question could be that China’s precipitous
rise—coupled with its formidable projection of hard power in Asia—has
given the United States an opportunity to stage a “return to Asia”
campaign in the capacity of a protector to nations that shudder at the
prospect of a fire-spitting dragon. As illustrated by the conversations
that Obama had with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen in respectively
Hawaii and Bali, both the United States and China however seem to prefer
win-win scenarios to zero-sum games. The outcome of the epic struggle
between the world’s sole superpower and the fast-rising quasi-superpower
depends then, on the give-and-take between the two giants—as well as
their ability to influence other stakeholders in the volatile region.
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