Introduce: Mr. Vo Minh Tap
Specialized: World History
Introduction
This book[1] is
devoted to security issues, geopolitics and international relations in Central
Asia, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001 and antiterrorist
operation of USA and their allies in Afghanistan.These changes in the world
politics and global balance of power had an impact on world and regional
situation.Actually, the geopolitical picture of the contemporary world has
rapidly changed before our eyes.This process started since September 11, 2001
and continued until 20-days war against Saddam’s Iraq in May-April 2003.
It is obvious that
security of Central Asia is strongly impacted by the West.But what is the
‘West’ in this regard? We focus on four major actors presenting the West, they
are the US, the European Union, the NATO and Turkey.All those geopolitical
players are closed connected each one with the other and they influence on
security of Central Asia in different ways.
Actually, having carried
out the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 years and having
placed the bases in Central Asian countries, the USA have undertaken a role of
the main military arbitrator in the center of Eurasia; a role which all other
conducting powers of region have refused.It is became obvious that only
American military power could eliminate Taliban regime and remove the direct
threat to Central Asia.However, the internal political situation in Afghanistan
is still a matter of great concern.The threat of internal peace violation in
this country is still exist.In spite of the international peace-making forces
presence in Afghanistan as guarantors of stability, the threat of
destabilization is still high.Hence, indirect threat to the security of Central
Asia is also exist.Besides, the international community has not solved another
urgent issue of drug trafficking from Afghanistan, what is actual not only for
Central Asia, but also for more remote regions of the CIS and Europe.
These great world powers
and the centres of geopolitical force involved in Central Asia are Russia, the
USA, China and the European Union.It is argued that the geopolitical
configuration in the Central Asian region, as well as the balance of power
between these large actors have changed.The influence of the West, first of all
the United States which have carried out the unprecedented for the modern epoch
military operation in Afghanistan and have created military infrastructure not
only on the territory of this country, but also in the number of Central Asian
states, has greatly increased.The policy of such largest neighbours of Central
Asia as Russia and China has also undergone some changes.Moscow and Beijing,
who were among the first countries rendered the support to American efforts in
the struggle against international terrorism in 2001, faced qualitatively new
situation in the region, touching their national interests, in the beginning of
2002.
The most obvious
consequence of geopolitical changes was quite frank and for the long time
expected movement of Russia towards the West.Rapprochement of Russia to USA,
and the European Union as a whole represents certainly a positive process with
really predicted positive consequences provided that the legitimate interests
of all sides there will be taken into account.It is should be mentioned, that
existed before suspiciousness, jealousy and misunderstanding of Moscow have
almost completely disappeared on the issue of independent contacts of CA
countries with the West.At the same time, the policy of Russia became some kind
of a signal for all the countries of the region to develop high-level contacts
with the West in military-political and strategic spheres.On the other hand,
such organizations as CST (Collective Security Treaty) and SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Organization) have faced in new situation with new challenges.All
members of these organizations have felt an urgent necessity to reconsider the
purposes and tasks of their participation in these organizations.
Being the largest
economic power the European Union aspires to be also one of military-political
and geopolitical centers in the world.The EU actively develops its common
foreign and defensive policy, tries to act as one actor on the world scene
though not always successfully.Nevertheless, the existence of an objective
trend is obvious: the EU prepares in future if not to compete with USA but
certainly to promote independent policy and to occupy its own geopolitical
place on international scene.This touchs on Central Asia since the EU tries to
include into its sphere of geopolitical interests not only the countries of
Eastern Europe, but also a significant part of the Central Eurasia, that is the
CIS, including Caucasus, Caspian Sea and the Central Asian region.“The
expansion” of EU is frequently treated as economic, technological and cultural
domination.
The NATO creates a good
opportunity to connect the Western, European and Eurasian security in
general.The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is clear evidence, as well as
Russian policy toward NATO.In the future the development of following scenario
should not be excluded, when the development of events will go in such a manner
that the certain consensus on the division of geopolitical roles between
Europe, America and Eurasia will be found.It is also possible, that instead of
the notion “Atlantic Europe” dominating for the last half-centuries, the notion
“the Eurasian Europe” will emerge.
From 1991, the security
policy of Kazakshtan, the largest and most economically important Central Asian
state, has been in a period of active formation.It is a part of regional
security structure of Central Asia, that is dependant on the CIS security
strategy and impacted by the process of Asian and global security.Inside the
last years, the major parties of security sphere were reliefed, they are the
West (USA), Russia, China and the Middle East (Muslim World).The US role during
these years was very active that had followed the American concerns on soonest
nuclear disarmament of Kazakhstan.But in 1995, after that the last nuclear
warhead from the last strategic missile was extracted and transported outside
Kazakhstan’s territory, so the US activity was decreased.It was revived in
connection with the US concerns over Caspian Sea oil and gas resources in 1997,
and particularly after the events of September 11, 2001.
Since the Taliban reached
the border of Central Asia in 1998, and particularly since the invasion of
Islamic insurgents into Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000, this
threat has become more actual.The United States is mostly concerned about the
strategic stability of the Caspian Sea and the future pipeline routes.The EU is
concentrated, especially since 1998, towards social stability and democratic
ground as the basis for stable development.Consequently, the EU and Germany
were concerned about a potential invasion of Islamists and the increasing
danger of general instability in the region.Thus, a potential impact of the
West on security in Central Asia grows in the next future enormously.
Two factors play an
important role in regional security: the NATO “Partnership for Peace” program
and the developing European Common Foreign and Security Policy, both factors
should be closely connected with OSCE principles regarding Central Asian
region.
In the first half of the
1990s, European politicians drew the absolutely fallacious conclusion about
tendencies unfolding in the region.They ignored the need for these republics
first to concentrate on the process of building a nation-state, which required
the consolidation of economic and political interests of newly emerging
elites.Although EU strategy at this point sought to encourage intra-regional
integration in Central Asia, in fact precisely the opposite process –
disintegration – was underway.The EU hoped to develop democratic and market
institutions at a time when the newly independent states needed first to create
authoritarian regimes that could preserve stability within and security from
without.
In the years of 2001-03,
the balance of forces in the region has been changing rapidly: the United
States came as a military factor and its influence became strongly felt across
the region.There is a latent yet gradually accelerating process of pushing
Russia out of its spheres of military-political and economic influence.By their
presence in Central Asia the United States and NATO have created a military
threat to China.There is also the need to neutralize the so-called Islamic
threat.
In 2005, several
political events and processes have changed the situation in the region
rapidly.First, there were the color revolution in Kyrgyzstan and fall of Askar
Akaev in March.This event raised the question about further geopolitical
orientation of Kyrgyzstan that is currently uncertain.Secondly, the revolt in
Uzbek city Andijan in May what provoked the serious deterioration of
relationship between Tashkent and the West, and consequently, reduced US
military presence in the region significantly.Thirdly, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) has realized in the July 2005 Summit a strong anti-American
demarche concerning the perspectives of US presence.Actually, it was a new step
to formation of a new regional military-political organization under the
Chinese-Russian dominance.And fourthly, the presidential elections in
Kazakhstan in December 2005 and its previous intrigue lead to the silent
consensus among the bigger powers relating to keep stability in Kazakhstan
notwithstanding with their different political goals and ideological motives.
Central Asia and the
nature of bilateral and multilateral relations in the region are changing at a
fast pace.The former geopolitical structure in Central Asia and around it that
stood on a triangle formed by the West (the U.S.plus Europe, NATO, Turkey, and
partly Japan), Russia, and China has collapsed.In the past Russia dominated in
the military-political sphere, American money was gradually penetrating the
local oil and gas sector, China remained neutral, while the Islamic South
threatened to destabilize the region.
At the same time, there
is a trend toward closer military-political cooperation within the Collective
Security Treaty, the SCO and closer integration within the Eurasian Economic
Community.As a result the search for compromises with Russia on delimitation of
the Caspian Sea and construction of alternative pipelines has intensified.
The Central Asian
countries expected that the United States will move toward closer regional
cooperation to confirm that it is serious about its plans in the region.Such
moves should include additional investments, broader bilateral cooperation in
the energy sector, search for a new security model and for possibilities of the
US strategic presence in the region that would take the interests of all states
into account.It is expected that Washington will tone down its criticism of the
situation in the sphere of human rights and democracy.
In the wake of the events
of 11 September geopolitics in Central Asia changed dramatically - on the whole
the above analysis says that we are witnessing a new stage of geopolitical
developments that will bring the region into a close contact with the world’s
economy and geopolitics.Today, the security situation is far from stable – old
threat has been replaced with new ones born by geopolitical rivalry in Central
Asia.The “Great Game” has entered another stage but it is far from being over.
Nevertheless, the Kazakhstan’s example in 2005-06 proved this fact
that the general external actors (US, EU, Russia and China) could collaborate
in Central Asia in principle for saving the stability and security.
The Geopolitical
Situation in Central Asia after September 11
The geopolitical
situation in the world and around Central Asia over the last years started
undergoing qualitative changes.Those changes concern: firstly, relations
between large geopolitical actors in the global context - the USA, Russia,
China, the European Union; secondly, policy of large geopolitical centers of
force towards Central Asia (the Caspian region and Caucasus); thirdly,
relations between large - the USA, Russia, China, the EU - and average
(regional) geopolitical actors - India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey: 1) with
each other; 2) in the context of geopolitics in Central Asia; fourthly, policy
of the Central Asian states in relations: 1) with each other; 2) with large and
regional actors.
The recent geopolitical
situation around and inside Central Asia is directly or indirectly affected by
the following factors: military conflicts with the involvement of the US and
its allies (Afghanistan, Iraq); situation in the Middle East; struggle against
international terrorism; OPEC’s oil policy; large transport and communications
projects (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the Kazakhstan-China, and Russia-Japan
pipelines, and etc); the NATO and EU expansion; integration policy in the
post-soviet territory (EES); process of ruling regime replacement in the CIS
countries.
Geopolitics and
geo-strategy of the United States are of really global character and touch upon
practically all regions and any state on the planet.The Central Asian region is
also not exclusion.The US policy in Central Asia in general is part of the
broader Eurasian strategy that touches upon the Caspian and the Caucasian
regions, Russia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South Asia and China along with
our region.
The US Eurasian strategy in turn is part of Washington’s global
strategy aimed at retaining US domination in the world economy and financial
system, consolidation of its military-strategic superiority, expansion of its
geopolitical influence in Eurasia, containment of its potential rivals (China,
the European Union, Russia), combating so-called international terrorism that
can be understood as establishment of control over the Islamic world.
The Unites States’
fundamental tasks also include creation of a kind of strategic barrier in the
post-soviet territory.This barrier is supposed to include such key republics as
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.Consolidation of these states’ relations with the NATO in different
forms and on different levels appears as an optimal instrument for the
realization of such strategy.What regards Russia, the United States first of
all fear its cooperation with China or Iran.
Washington has a
complicated and ambivalent task: on the one hand, the US have to avoid
restoration of Russia’s strategic control in this territory or creation of
political alliance between Moscow, Beijing and Teheran, and, on the other hand,
America is forced to cooperate with Russia in order to avoid destabilization in
Eurasia.
Thus, relations of Russia
and the USA contain many contradictions and collisions of interests.The most
important aspect of these relations for us is that concerning Central Asia and
the Caspian region.As appears from the above, neither USA nor Russia intend to
leave the region or to give up their positions voluntarily.At that both
Washington and Moscow demonstrate high level of activity and at times even
aggressiveness.On the other hand, both sides would like to avoid open
confrontation and come to mutually acceptable compromise.
US President George
W.Bush and a number of his advisors are conciliatory in regard of Moscow.They
provided the maximum possible compromise in the course of negotiations on the
abolition of sanctions against Iraq and advocate Russia’s accession to the WTO.
But a number of
influential Washington politicians and political circles made a conclusion
after the events in Iraq that the so-called «strategic choice of Russia» after
the September 11, 2001 events with support to the USA represented only a
tactical move with the purpose of settling concrete external political tasks of
Moscow (improvement of relations with the USA, reduction of Islamic threat from
the south, and etc.).These circles consider Putin’s external political course
in general as anti-American and believe that finally Russia intends to create a
strategic alliance with «Old Europe» and use it for the completion of its
modernization and restoration of its lost influence in Caucasus and Central
Asia with the help of it.They view further US strategy as the continuation of
active aggressive policy in this region, consolidation here, pressing out and
isolation of Russia.
The US strategy in
Central Asia is a distillation of Washington’s general Eurasian strategy.That
is, without establishment of full internal and external political and economic
control over the states of the region the whole US Eurasian geopolitics loses
significance.
Military political
presence of the US in Central Asia produced both positive and negative
consequences.First of all, we have to admit that the US do not intend to leave
the region in the short-run or in the medium-run, and probably in the long
run.The main positive effect of the US presence here is that the US will in no
case allow repeated threat to Central Asia from radical Islam, considering it
as a threat to its national interests.
However negative
potential of US influence on security and stability in the region can exceed
the positive effect in prospects.First of all this concerns involvement of
Central Asia in the track of the Unites States’ policy that would inevitably
occur in case of Washington’s confrontation with neighbors of the region,
including Russia, China, and Iran.
Any form of US-Russian
confrontation would threaten with the split of the region of Central Asia.At
that Kazakhstan would most likely take a pro-Russian position.In such case it
would inevitably face various sanctions and provocations aimed at
destabilization of the existing regime.
Another direction of the
US strategy that contains clearly destabilizing potential for the region can be
opposition between the US and China on the geopolitical level, which would
inevitably touch upon Central Asia that represents a convenient base for the
creation of threat to China’s strategic rear by the United States.Beijing’s
reciprocal actions can lead to direct military threat to the region.The most
dangerous could be purposeful actions of Washington directed on destabilization
of disagreeable regimes and their replacement.
The main conclusion from
the analysis of prospects of possible developments and changing of the
character of relations between the RK and the US is that the field for
political maneuver of Kazakhstan between the US and Russia abruptly converges
compared to the previous period.Further there can appear another real threat
that Kazakhstan may get in a geopolitical snare; absence of possibilities for
political maneuvering and inevitability of choosing in favor of only one
geopolitical force would lead to worsening of relations with another side with
all the ensuing consequences for its security.
In an effort to realize
its strategic and geopolitical purposes the United States use a number of
methods and instruments that are not new, but still considered efficient by the
White House.They include economic assistance, ideological pressure, and even,
applied to special cases, special operations, political provocations and
sabotage: artificial organization of political crises, support and funding of
oppositional or even if necessary of radical forces, open interference in
internal affairs, exaggeration of accusations for corruption, and etc.
After G.W.Bush came to
power and especially after the September 11 2001 events two regions - Central
Asia and Caucasus became not simply two strategically important regions for the
USA, but also the main constituents in the US struggle against international
terrorism.Washington put forward the main purpose to form new geopolitical
situation in the region that would be beneficial for the United States.
However, according to
evaluations of US strategic planning experts, the US long military presence in
the region brings in an element of strategic uncertainty.They in particular
suggest that American military forces would play important role in the regional
affairs in future, and this makes it the regional military-political force that
nobody would be able to ignore.Moreover, American strategists put the following
question: «will the US military forces remain neutral» in case of the change of
ruling regimes in the countries of the region and in cases when such a change
represents threat to their security, bases, communications, logistics, and
etc.?
This means that at
present Washington is already considering variants of interference in cases of
unfavorable developments in the region for the US like radical consolidation of
anti-US spirit, terrorist acts, political destabilization, change of ruling
regimes, and abrupt external political reorientation of the regional states
into the opposite side from the US.
US analysts offer to
change the US strategy in the Central Asian region proceeding from the fact
that growing anti-American spirits appear as some of reasons for
reconsideration of the US current public diplomacy in regard of Central
Asia.According to the last recommendations the US is supposed to continue
geopolitical separation of the Central Asian region from Caucasus.Central Asia
is closer to the Middle East and South Eastern Asia, while Caucasus is closer
to Europe.Further the US has to overstep the limits of a view that the Caspian
region is a critical point for the provision of security in Eurasia.Caspian
resources are important only for the energy market.
Another prospective
direction of the US foreign policy in the region, as considered, is development
of nationally oriented civil societies in Central Asia.Majority of analysts
believe that the US has to support protection of human rights and other aspects
that may resound with the public opinion.This in turn would allow creating a
foundation for political movements that would be able to appear as functional
opposition to the ruling regime after some time.The leading American analysts
appeal to the US leadership to change the conception of its strategy in the
Central Asian region and attach a number of recommendations including
re-deployment of military bases from Uzbekistan to the Kazakhstani territory.
The main conclusion
related to the US strategy in Eurasia is that it is determined first of all by
geopolitical factors.Instead of providing support in agrarian reforms,
high-tech development, expansion of humanitarian aid, the US government focused
on the expansion of military political contacts with the Central Asian and
Caucasian states; and this forms a core of cooperation between Washington and
countries of this region.
A number of US
specialists believe that Washington needs to form a correct political course in
regard of this region.The aid provided by the US to countries in Central Asia
and Caucasus should not relate only to the military.It should first of all be
directed towards establishment of political and public institutions, as well as
the development of more diversified economies in these states.
The foundation of
bilateral relations between China and the US still is the symbiosis of «mutual
fears» and «mutual benefit».China perceives threat to its interests in the US
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and in Central Asia that is
maintained because of Washington’s notion about China as the main potential
rival to the US in the region.The United States view China as its new and
future global competitor that builds up its military and economic might for the
purposes of weakening the US position in the world, a number of US analysts
believe.Along with that neither China nor the US consider each other as sources
of direct military threat at present.American strategists are concerned with
the results of their own forecasts, according to which in the existing
conditions China’s military potential after 2015 will be comparable with the US
military potential, and further China will start surpassing America in economic
and military development.
In this connection
Washington’s policy towards China as a part of the US Eurasian strategy will be
built (for the purposes of retaining US presence in Central Asia) on the
following elements: consolidation of cooperation between the NATO and the SCO,
support and encouragement of trends towards consolidation of border lines in
the region (under technical control of NATO and the US), requirement of
transparency in regard of air-force bases and anti-terrorist center of the SCO
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, initiation of various
military-technical programs (mine clearing) with active participation of the
West; strengthening of intelligence activities and creation of training centers
to prevent consolidation of Chinese influence under the pretext of combating
drug-trafficking.
The main problem of
Russian-Chinese relations is that both Russia and China have not gotten free of
the efforts to turn to advantage from contradictions that another side has with
the US.Moscow and Beijing fail to build new Russian-Chinese relations in the
context of improving relations of the both sides separately with the US so
far.Moreover, rapprochement of Russia and the US produced some conflicts in
relations between Russia and China regarding a number of issues.
China in its policy in
regard of Central Asia is guided by the so-called Pan-Asiatic strategic
conception, the purpose of which is economic and transport integration of Central
Asia and western China with further connection of these regions with the common
network of communications with China’s internal and coastal regions.At that
Beijing means not only economic integration, but also strengthening of its
political and cultural influence as well as demographic presence in the future.
The West welcomed the
developments after the USSR collapse when China could satisfy its growing
energy needs by resources of Central Asia.This could be a restraining factor
for China’s ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.According to the western
vision of the situation, China’s influence in the region had to grow in the
region in the medium and long run, while Russia’s influence was expected to
decrease.But by the end of 1990s the West began understanding that there was a
real threat that Central Asia could become a sphere of influence («rear yard»)
of China.
The Chinese strategy in
Central Asia is not independent but determined by positions of such powers as
Russia and the United States nowadays.
Re-deployment of Uygur
and anti-Chinese separatist organizations from Europe to US continued in the
last two years, and they keep being financed and provided with organizational
support.This means that the US at least reserves instruments of pressure over
Beijing for the case of confrontation with it.But the most important American
instrument still is military-political presence of Washington in Central Asia.
Understanding that the US
military presence in Central Asia is «for a good long while» but having no real
instruments of influencing on the states of the region with a purpose to remove
this challenge, for the purposes of providing its security China, on the one
hand, strengthened its army grouping deployed in the XUAR.On the other hand it
undertook efforts towards consolidation of «Chinese component» in the
structures of regional security, first of all, in the SCO.Though initially
China did not accept the US military presence in the region actively, today it
has certainly corrected its position; if US presence in the region is directed
only towards combating terrorism and limited within the period of combating
terrorism, then it is acceptable.
The importance of China
for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and security since the moment of gaining
independence was of dual character: this simultaneously represented a threat
and new chances for economic development.
It is obvious that since
1992 till 2000 China was a winning side in the region.Gco strategic and
military political successes of China in Central Asia include the following:
disappearance of geopolitical competitor, which was the USSR; gradual
withdrawal of Russia from the region and objective economic weakness of the
Central Asian new independent states; direct territorial gains; direct economic
benefit from trading with the countries of the region, especially with
Kazakhstan; economic rise of Xingjian thanks to the improvement of geopolitical
situation and intensification of economic relations with Central Asia and other
markets through it; establishment of control over trans-border rivers and their
exploitation for own benefit; creation of a geopolitical organization (SCO)
with obvious domination of China; distribution of China’s geopolitical
ambitions up to the Caspian Sea.
Appearance of the US in
Central Asia as an active military-political player immediately cancelled all
China’s geopolitical achievements of the last decade.In answer to Beijing’s
support of the US-led anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan Washington
included the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan into the list of terrorist
organizations.But this move does not have any real matter.Re-deployment of
Uygur and anti-Chinese separatist organizations from Europe to the US territory
and their funding and organizational support continued in the last two years.
This means that the US at
least reserves instruments of pressure over Beijing for the case of
confrontation with it.But the most important American instrument still is its
military-political presence in Central Asia, the expansion of which is
restrained by Russia so far.
We have to admit that
from the view of China’s geopolitical interests Central Asia is not the prior
direction.China’s future strategic interests concern the Asia-Pacific region
and South Eastern Asia.Future contradictions between China and the USA develop
right here (firstly because of Taiwan).But, considering the forthcoming
confrontation with the US, China needs to provide safe rear in Central Asia.But
Washington has actually deprived Beijing of this possibility by its appearing
in the region.
Nevertheless, despite
secondary importance of Central Asia for Chinese geo-strategy, Beijing started
realizing its traditional strategy in the region in the form of economic and
demographic penetration though in a limited scale.First of all this concerns
Kazakhstan, and less sensitive it is in Kyrgyzstan.
Considering China’s
historic traditions, its geopolitical ambitions, colossal demographic potential
and economic growth potential for Kazakhstan’s geo-strategic prospects it would
be positive if Chinese presence in the region in any form was limited.In this
case the US geo-strategic presence appears as such limiter.
It is not excluded that
the Moscow-Beijing angle is temporary and sooner or later Russia will have to
choose between strategic cooperation with the West and with China.Despite its
external attractiveness, grand energy projects with Chinese participation
already contain great geopolitical risk both for Russia and Kazakhstan.
If in the first half of
the 1990s economic interests dominated in China’s policy in regard of Central
Asia, and it had a task to «settle concrete issues of China’s economic
development using a favorable moment», then at present the situation has
changed qualitatively.Not only purely economic but also geo-strategic interests
became prior.This can explain impetuous increase of commercial operations with
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even with Tajikistan, as well as transition to the
qualitatively new level of relations with Kazakhstan.This also explains why the
issues of collective security and «struggle against Islamic fundamentalism» and
extremism that feed national-separatist movement in the Chinese XUAR became
prior in relations between China and the Central Asian states.China’s main task
is to achieve liquidation of guerilla groups in Central Asia, who support the
idea of independence of so-called Eastern Turkestan.On the other hand, using
the coincidence of its interests in combating terrorism with similar interests
of Russia and the US, China puts a task to raise its political role in the
region.
The September 11, 2001
events and the following US-led anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan became
a reference point for another stage in Russia’s policy in Central Asia.After
September 11 the geopolitical situation in Central Asia underwent considerable
changes.An absolutely new military-political configuration appeared; in many
respects it conditioned weakening of Russia’s position.Weakening of Russia’s
position in the region put Moscow in front of a necessity to revise its foreign
policy and build new of relations with its partners in Central Asia now with
consideration of the US presence in the region.
The policy of so-called «regional parity» can promote eliminations
of weakness of the Russian position.The USA cannot but understand that after
the military settlement of the existing problem finishes, Central Asia,
Caucasus and Asia as a whole will get new strategic and political tasks that
would need other methods, such as economic, ideological, political, and
informational, Russia has a built system of managing intra-regional processes
and the proper experience, but for the US it is beyond its strength to settle
these tasks in many aspects.
Thus the essence of the
«regional parity» policy is that Russia could appear in separate regions of
Eurasia and in some situations as an equal geopolitical force with the USA and
the West and represent Russian-American interests in such cases, as for the USA
it will take much more time to accumulate experience that Russia has in regard
of Central Asia as a whole.
However the situation
changed in 2001 -2002 and there is an impression that Russia loses its previous
position as a guarantor of security in Central Asia.Nevertheless, in 2002
Moscow undertook moves to consolidate its military political presence in the
region, in particular in Kyr-gyzstan.Despite the possible loss of its
considerable share of influence in the region by Russia, this factor will keep
being important for Kazakhstan and its security in the long run.
From the view of security
and military-strategic stability it is not likely that the EU and
Russia/Eurasia are able to create an isolated military-political or
geopolitical alliance.Seemingly, this will concern formation of a structure on
the base of the NATO consisting of three or four elements:
USA-EU-Eurasia-(Japan).The matter concerns full-fledged military strategic
union between the present West and the CIS (Russia), the contours of which took
shape after September 11, 2001.
Russian strategists at
present fear that Tajikistan may withdraw form the area of Russia’s military
political influence and following Uzbekistan’s example, join the states
adherent to Washington.The US side carried out active policy in regard of
Dushanbe since last year.In the course of his visit to the USA in 2002
E.Rakhmonov got considerable political advances at the White House in the form
of two-year long cooperation in the military sphere, broad financial
assistance, and etc.The Kremlin is concerned by the fact that Rakhmonov in his
annual speech to the parliament mentioned no a word about the prior partnership
with Russia.
All this offers Moscow to start urgent and decisive actions in
regard of Dushanbe in order to avoid weakening of its influence.It is
characteristic that Russian special services still evaluate the threat from the
Afghan territory as high.Thus the Afghan factor, considering Russia’s potential
and its relations with the Northern Alliance can easily be used to put pressure
on Dushanbe.
A number of experts
believe that the growing military activity of Russia in the region relates not
to the Afghan problem itself, and even not to the threat of expansion of the
American presence in Central Asia, but with the threat of possible
destabilization of the ruling regimes in Kyr-gyzstan and Uzbekistan at a
greater respect (and in Turkmenistan at less respect), large social disorders
in the Fergana valley and Bukhara region.In this case the threat from the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Afghan islamists will grow considerably.
Russia’s policy towards
Turkmenistan was characterized by big strategic gains and simultaneous tactical
carelessness.Successes of the Russian strategy of course include signing of a
long-term agreement on gas supply in April 2003.Russia, in fact, bought Turkmen
gas for many years ahead and thus blocked any attempts of constructing
pipelines towards south (there will be nothing to fill the pipeline).But Moscow
made concessions to the Turkmen leader in the issues of dual citizenship and
since last year it connives at full violation of human rights in Turkmenistan
and wide-ranging repressions of this regime.
The Russian policy
towards Tashkent is contradictory.On the one hand, Moscow is objectively
interested in maintenance of stability in Uzbekistan with I.Karimov’s ruling.On
the other hand, worsening of relations between Uzbekistan and the West is
favorable for Putin’s strategy directed towards strengthening of Russia’s
influence in Central Asia.The Uzbek leader understands this clearly and now
tries to play on contradictions between Russia and the US.
Russia has not provided a
reliable transit bypassing the Fergana valley through Kazakhstan and the
Bishkek-Osh Kyrgyz motor highway, so its largest off-Russia group of the Armed
Forces in the Republic of Tajikistan can be cut off the rear provision.At the
same time Russian gas giant - Gazprom - has already expressed interest in
purchasing 44 percent stake in the Uzbek pipeline monopoly - Uzbektransgaz.The
deal could ease supplies of Turkmen gas to Russia via Uzbek pipelines.
In such conditions when
Uzbekistan has US special forces on its territory and fully depends on Western
financial assistance, Tashkent has no another way except relying on the Russian
political support once more.If Karimov managed to convince Moscow of
seriousness of its intentions to restore full-fledged cooperation with
consideration of Russia’s interests, then Putin would provide necessary support
to Karimov against pressure of the West.
Practically, the next
rapprochement of Uzbekistan and Russia began during Karimov’s visit to Moscow
in mid April 2004.But it goes on in qualitatively new political conditions:
cooling of relations between Uzbekistan and the US, development of anti-Karimov
direction in Washington’s policy; contraction of field for political
maneuvering for the Uzbek leader, and consequent strengthening of Karimov’s
dependence on Moscow.
Despite pronouncedly
friendly relations of the two leaders and two countries the Kazakhstani-Russian
relations entered a qualitatively new stage.It is characterized by different
understanding of purposes and tasks, as well as methods of carrying out their
economic strategy, internal, and especially external policies by Kazakhstan and
Russia.At that the commonness of strategic and even geopolitical interests of
the two countries remains a long-term and may be even eternal factor that
arises from the Eurasian character of development of the both states.
Future importance of
Russia for Kazakhstan’s safe and stable development should not be underestimated
or overestimated.Geographic configuration in the region changes very rapidly
and is characterized by gradual forcing out of Russia from its previous
position.Both Washington and Beijing are interested in the weakening of
Moscow’s status in the region at some extent.At the same time, considering
prospects of their possible mutual confrontation neither the USA nor China are
interested in full weakening of Russia in Central Asia as their potential
partner against the other side.
The most critical for the Russian side are our independent
relations with the West on the entire complex of issues.The self-evident
previous Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia in the military-technical sphere
becomes the thing of the past.Astana actively develops it relations with the
West in this sphere both within the NATO and on the bilateral basis.These
activities arise concerns of Moscow, as well as Beijing, which is Russia’s and
Kazakhstan’s partner in the SCO.This concerns first of all participation of
western states - the USA, Germany and the UK in modernization of Kazakhstan’s
air defense system.Moreover, Moscow would hardly welcome the US plans to build
a military base on the Kazakhstani coast of the Caspian Sea in direct closeness
to its vital military-strategic objects and polygons.
Moscow pays rapt
attention to the growing pressure of Washington over Kazakhstan.The Russian
side is specifically irritated by the fact that harsh critiques of Kazakhstan
and its leadership appears right in moments of next Kazakhstani-Russian
rapprochement.Russian politicians have no doubts already that the main purpose
of the US policy in Kazakhstan is to isolate the republic from integration
processes involving Russia and to avoide rapprochement of Astana and Moscow in
any form.
In general, Russia that
formerly was indifferent to Kazakhstan’s abstract statements about the
participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project now becomes more and more
nervous when this project is about to be realized.Kremlin not always
understands our actions in the world arena in regard of critical international
problems, such as, for example, the Iraqi problem.Seemingly, Moscow hoped for
our solidarity with the Russian position.
And finally, still, right
as it was in early 1990s, the problem of Baikonur remains urgent.Russia
practically makes no secret of its intention to turn down this space center and
develop other cosmodromes on its territory or even to launch rockets from the
European space center in South America in the average-term.
Among its strategic tasks
Kazakhstan needs to save its military-political alliance with Russia within the
frameworks of the Collective Security Treaty, take care of the reached
consensus in the Caspian, and keep being loyal to Russia’s position in the CIS,
SCO, EEC, and EES.
The Caspian problem
represents the most uneasy challenge for Kazakhstan’s future.It touches upon
the republic’s relations with practically all big geopolitical players,
including Russia, the USA, China, Iran, and the European Union.
Until the recent time the most probable scenario of developments
in the Caspian was the following.Geopolitics in the Caspian comes to
exclusively two alternative routes of pipelines - the northern (Russia-Europe)
and south-western (Baku-Ceyhan).The USA establishes strategic control over all
the Persian Gulf resources, first of all in Iraq; and this allows Washington
manipulating prices in the world crude market.Iran, as a geopolitical power, is
being removed from the game.At the same time Washington cuts short China’s
ambitions for the Eurasian energy resources.Through political and economic
pressure over the Caspian and other interested states it imposes the
Baku-Ceyhan route.
Another scenario can
develop if the economic might of the European Union promotes development of the
northwestern route (with variations on the Caucasus and in South-Eastern
Europe).Its strategic and geopolitical importance will lie in the union of
Eurasia and Europe, or in unification of the post-soviet states’ resources and
the EU economic potential.Optimal chronological frames of this process concern
2010-2020 with consideration of depletion of oil resources of the North sea
after 2010.
Also Iran’s withdrawal
from geopolitical isolation is not excluded.In this case, a possibility of the
Iranian southern route should be considered.It may fully shut perspectives of
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.Character of relations between Teheran and other
Caspian states will be of great importance for this perspective.
Russia is absolutely not
interested in withdrawal of Iran from the geopolitical game and establishment
of pro-US regime in this country.At present Russia has considerable economic
interests in Iran related to the atomic program, and even more to the
modernization of Iranian armed forces.
Concerning developments
in the Caspian, US analysts come to a conclusion that Moscow is ahead of the
West in the region.This happens thanks to Russia’s long-term agreements with
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on oil and gas transit as well as on attractive
pipeline projects towards the Baltic Sea and use of gas condensate from the
Karachaganak field.
The main disputable issue
between Russia and the West will concern development of routes for the
transportation of oil from Kashagan.Russia attempts to block oil transportation
via the Caspian Sea by large-capacity tankers and through construction of an
underwater pipeline.Moscow’s purpose, according to western analysts, is
combination of Russian and Caspian oil into one pool under Russia’s
control.Along with direct economic dividends this will also provide a
possibility of political pressure over European consumers.Russia’s weak spot is
deterioration of Russian pipelines and their comparatively low carrying
capacity.
It is necessary to point
out two factors (instruments) of European strategy in Central Asia: the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the OSCE.Moreover,
European strategy is partially realized within the NATO - the North-Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Euro-Atlantic partnership and the «Partnership for
Peace» program.
Actually, Europe has no
strategy in regard of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, if we understand this term
as maintenance of systematic policy.At the same time the EU’s purposes in the
region were clear from the very beginning, but there were no instruments for
achieving them.Those purposes were ambitious and means were very
insignificant.On the level of the European Union this situation was expressed
in the situation that all the EU activities were directed towards the regions
that were close to its borders.The OSCE at that has almost no resources to
realize the European strategy.What regards policies of separate European
powers, in this case this concerned low level of strategic interests,
insufficient historic presence and clearly formulated priorities.
Potential for the
European contribution in the provision of security in the region and its deeper
involvement in the regional politics appeared after September 11.The European
Commission clearly understands that the Caspian resources are supposed to play
an important role in the energy provision of Europe (and decrease dependence of
the EU on Russia) in the future.Moreover, the European Union is concerned with
such problems as illegal drug imports.In general, the EU’s strategic (or
normative) purposes concern establishment of liberal democracy and domination
of law and human rights in the region, as well as opening of the region to the
European and International Economic system through liberalization and
democratization.
With Kazakhstan the EU
expressed lack of strategic thinking.Rather efficient economic relations
between the EU and the RK within the framework of the Agreement on partnership
and cooperation did not entail consolidation of Brussels’ political
influence.The EU transport-energy strategy turned to be more systematic, it was
aimed at realization of strategic purposes of the European Energy Charter
through the development of TRACECA and INOGATE projects and making the Caspian
resources serve in favor of European interests.
We can mark out three
reasons why there is no European strategy towards Kazakhstan: 1) Central Asia
as a whole and Kazakhstan in particular do not represent prior areas for
Europe; 2) achievement of European strategic purposes is complicated by
existence of a difficult mechanism of decision making; 3) large European states
would not like to give up its sovereignty in maintenance of foreign and defense
policy in favor of many-sided structures that is directly reflected on the
development of a common strategy towards Central Asia in particular.
The EU policy in general
can be characterized as «proto-strategy».This means that in fact the European
Union has not gotten an efficient strategy towards Kazakhstan and the whole
region.It is beyond question that the EU expansion in one or another form would
affect the situation in the post-soviet territory.Is has already caused
economic conflicts between Brussels and Moscow concerning the revision of the
whole system of commercial relations between Russia and Central and Eastern
European countries.Kazakhstan also does not stand aside.The European Union is
the largest trade partner to the republic beyond the CIS.
From the political point
of view the EU movement to the east can deepen disintegration spirits in the
CIS.Meanwhile Brussels feed pro-European spirits in Moldova, Ukraine and
Caucasian republic promising from time to time their integration into Europe,
this can have negative effect on the integration processes in Eurasia.But still
Russia, Kazakhstan, and most of the CIS countries will have to close in with
Europe in some political and economic issues.The matter consists of how
economically expedient and politically equal this process would be for these
countries.
The so-called
Stabilization Treaty for Caspian countries was developed in the European
Community.It consists of three elements: (1) development of a transport
communications network along the East-West line versus the existing North-South
routes; (2) consolidation of democracy and a market economy in the region’s new
sovereign states; (3) transition from geopolitics to economic competition.These
conditions form the basis for the European Union’s investments into the Caspian
countries’ economies.N.Nazarbaev supported this idea during his visits to
Berlin and other European capitals in 2001-2004.
Because of aggravated
situation in Central Asia and the increasing threat to national security,
Kazakhstan intensifies its relations with the EU.At the same time, Europe
expresses keen interest in the region.Nevertheless, it is necessary to note
that the EU does not have any strategies with regard to Central Asia.Big
European states have different economic and political interests in this
region.This connects with the internal peculiarities of European policy and the
general geopolitical situation, including relations between the EU, the U.S.,
and Russia.At the same time, the events of 2000 and 2001 demonstrated that the
prevailing theme in relations between Europe, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia was
the problem of regional security and the fight against terrorism and drug
trafficking.After 9/11, the decisive factor in the development of European
policy toward Central Asia was Afghanistan.The crisis of 2001 increased the
urgency of the issue of how to terminate Europe’s dependence on Arabic oil.The
events of 9/11 transformed the search for hydrocarbons in the Caspian region
into a real policy of high-priority significance.In the future, this factor
will define the development of relations between Kazakhstan and some European
states, and the European Community on the whole.
The current international position of the RK is characterized by
the following processes: in the external political direction it maintains the
policy of balancing between great political power centers (versatile
diplomacy).It maintains relations with Russia on rather high level.With China
Kazakhstan carries out distanced and cautious policy using different mechanisms
(SCO, CICA).The events of 2001-2002 removed the most serious threat to security
in Central Asia from the militant Islamism for the coming future.In relations
with the West it reached temporary stabilization.The policy towards Central
Asia as well as the CIS develops mechanically over the recent years.Development
of the Caspian continues despite some political and geopolitical obstacles.The
new correlation of powers around Central Asia appearing as a result of
formation of new geopolitical situation threatens Kazakhstan with the
appearance of new threats and challenges to its security and stability.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Geopolitical Situation in
Central Asia
One of the most
perspective and effective regional organizations seems to be the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).Before 2001 it was called “Shanghai Five”
according to the number of original members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan.Initially “Shanghai Five” was created to solve boundary
questions.The member-states signed such founding documents as the Agreement on
Confidence Measures Strengthening in military sphere along the borders
(Shanghai, April 26, 1996) and the Agreement on armed forces mutual reduction
in the border area (Moscow, April, 24, 1997).Afterwards the parties to treaties
met regularly at the levels of heads of states, Defense and Foreign Affairs ministers,
heads of law enforcement bodies and special services.During following regular
summit held in June 200 in Shanghai the organization was enlarged by new member
– Uzbekistan.At this summit “Shanghai Five” was transformed into Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.The members also signed Convention on combating
terrorism, separatism and extremism.
Specifically, in the
Shanghai summit in April 1996, the heads of these Five states signed an
Agreement on Strengthening Measures of Trust in the Military Sphere in Border
Areas, and in April 1997 they signed a further agreement on the mutual
reduction of armed forces in border areas.The agreements are to remain in
effect until 31 December 2020, with a possible prolongation for another five
years.In contrast to the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS, these documents
provide for concrete actions and specify:
An extraordinary meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of SCO member-states was held in January 10,
2002 in Beijing.The sides achieved the unity of opinions on the issue of the
settlement in Afghanistan and the quick restoration of its economy, and also
expressed the support to the temporary government of Afghanistan led by
H.Karzay.An important event in the evolution of SCO became a regular summit,
held on June 6 of 2002, in Saint Petersburg.The summit resulted in signing
three documents: SCO Charter, Agreements on Regional antiterrorist structure
and Declaration of Heads of the member-states of the organization.Signing of
the main document – the SCO Charter – has marked complete institutionalization
of the organization.
Kazakhstan’s Interests
and Balance within SCO
Over the past ten years,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a key player for
Kazakhstan’s international standing and the geopolitical processes in Central
Asia (CA) more generally.At the present time, the SCO counts six member states:
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.A group of
states, originally known as the “Shanghai Five,” has existed since 1996.Members
of the Shanghai Five were united in their search for solutions to the problems
relating to questions of frontiers and settling of territorial issues along the
borders between the former Soviet Union and China.Later, in 2000, a decision
was taken to transform the Shanghai Five into a regional structure for
multilateral cooperation in various fields.In 2001, the SCO was created in
Shanghai as a new international organization.It was implemented legally at the
June 2002 summit in St.Petersburg, where the SCO Charter, the Agreement on the
Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) and the Joint Declaration of the Heads
of State were also signed.Uzbekistan joined the SCO in the same year.
What initially stands out
about this organization is the disproportion between its members: it includes
giants such as China and Russia on the one hand, and considerably smaller
Central Asian states on the other – in terms of their political weight, the
scale of their economies, their demography and the size of their territories.Considering
this uneven playing field, it is worth pondering what exactly Kazakhstan may
get out of the SCO.
Kazakhstan’s
participation and interests in the SCO are influenced by several factors: The
first one is geopolitical, stemming from the participation in the organization
of two major powers, Russia and China.These two powers automatically cast a
shadow over the remaining members of the SCO.Indeed, Russia and China have
their own, specific geopolitical interests which extend far beyond the boundaries
of the region: China’s concerns lie predominantly in Asia (the Northeast,
Southeast and Asia-Pacific region); those of Russia are in Europe and the
Euro-Atlantic area (relations with the EU and NATO); while both countries share
complex relations with the USA.In addition to this, Russia has its own
interests in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, where China is
increasingly influential.Geopolitical relations between Russia and China (as
the leading members of the SCO) as well as their relation with the outside
world are of great concern[2]
It is important to
understand, therefore, the extent to which this bilateral relation in turn
forms the strategic background of Kazakhstan’s own international affairs.The
second aspect, closely linked to the first, relates to security issues.In 2002,
the Agreement on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure was signed within the
framework of the SCO, and implemented by the creation of the SCO regional
antiterrorist structure in 2004.Kazakhstan’s interests depend on the SCO’s
capacity to protect Kazakhstan (as well as otherCentral Asian countries) from
the threat of radical Islamism.As this concerns the fundamental question of
security, it is important to rememberthat the SCO was originally set up to
guarantee the inviolability and security of its member states’ borders: the
Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas was signed on
24 April 1997, and the Agreement on Strengthening Mutual Trust in Military
Fields in Border Areas on 26 April 1996 (which came into force on 7 May 1998).
The third aspect is an
economic one.Since 2000, when the decision to transform the “Shanghai Five”
into a regional structure was taken, repeated announcements and efforts have
been made to encourage economic integration within the SCO.Yet the SCO needs to
contribute to Kazakhstan’s economic development and well-being if it is to
serve the country’s interests.The fourth aspect, lastly, concerns regional
integration, namely, the extent to which all the constituent elements of the
SCO (geopolitical, economic, multilateral and bilateral relations) influence
regional politics and the relations between the republics of Central Asia, as
well as how this in turn affects Astana’s interests.
The wide range of
questions raised by the SCO highlights the diversity of potential issues the
organization faces.A number of these, however, are often solved outside the
framework of the SCO.These include Russian-Chinese, Russian-American and
Chinese-American relations; security problems with regard to the respective
roles of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization)[3], NATO
and the SCO; bilateral relations of the Central Asian countries—both among
themselves and between them and the great powers.Consequently, there is no SCO
policy per se.However, the very fact that the SCO exists and seems to be active
in the area of foreign policy (or geopolitics) creates the perception (or at
least the illusion) of there being a new and serious player on the regional and
international stage.In this context and in regard to Kazakhstan’s foreign
policy, it is worth pondering whether the SCO is little more than a trompe
l’oeil.
The SCO’s activities in
the field of security are, to a large extent, purely declarative, although the
organization could play a significant role in certain areas - in Afghanistan,
for example.Indeed, since the fall of the Taliban there has been little
progress in that country.It is, for example, the source of a large flow of
drugs, which the new administration cannot control.It is assumed that a
substantial part of the income from this trade funds Islamic terrorist groups,
which have not been eradicated by “Operation Enduring Freedom.”
This threat directly
concerns the six member states of the SCO.China fears, and with good reason, that
Uighur clandestine groups could form a common front with the Islamists.The
concern is no longer an independent Uighur state in Xinjiang, but rather a
“caliphate,” which would encompass Central Asia and neighboring regions.For
Russia, the threat from the south is highly significant: it is essential to
prevent militants and drugs from infiltrating Russian territory by maintaining
the southern republics of Central Asia stable at all costs.
In the spring and summer
of 2004, and then in 2005, the terrorist underworld once again issued
Uzbekistan with a reminder of its presence there by carrying out a series of
terrorist acts.In Tashkent, authorities are fully aware that the fuse of
Islamic terrorism could light the powder keg that is the Fergana valley - considered
so because of the acute social and demographic problems there.In Kyrgyzstan,
many Islamists live almost openly in camps in the southern part of the
republic: they are not active against local powers, but instead attack Chinese
representatives and are spreading into Uzbekistan.Tajikistan has also seen the
full spectrum of terrorist threats.Over the course of many years, even after
the civil war ended, the territory of this republic has been permeated with
both Afghan militants and Tajik Islamists trained on Afghan soil.At first
glance, Kazakhstan appears to be the only state in a more advantageous
position, but this is merely an illusion of security.The possibility of
destabilization in southern Kazakhstan cannot be ruled out.Besides, Kazakhstan
also has to take into account the Uighur factor in its relations with China.
As far as the SCO’s place
in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is concerned, the organization is currently of
some importance, at least officially.In its capacity as chairman of the
organization, Kazakhstan arranged a meeting of the Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs at the end of February 2005 to discuss the question of
maintaining stability in SCO territory, the organization’s international
activities, current problems of modernity, and the acceleration of efforts to
implement the Tashkent initiative on creating a partnership network of
multilateral partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.The second meeting of
Security Council secretaries from SCO member states was held in Astana in early
June 2005, to discuss questions of security and stability in SCO territory and
neighboring regions, as well as measures to strengthen cooperation between SCO
member states to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism.
The tenth meeting of SCO
heads of state, held on 5 July 2005 in Astana, was heralded as a major
international event.It was then that Iran, India and Pakistan were conferred
the status of observer.Among the seven documents signed at this summit was the
framework for cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism and
extremism.The SCO member states agreed to carry out joint anti-terrorism
instruction and personnel training, and to share their acquired experience.But
the main outcome of this summit was the SCO’s declaration on the duration of
the stationing of US military bases in Central Asia.The majority of
commentators considered this declaration to be an ultimatum directed against
the United States.However, after a time, the attitudes of the different parties
became more divided.Kyrgystan, for example, has essentially repudiated this
“anti-American statement.” During the visit of US Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, to the region in July 2005 Bishkek stressed that Kyrgyzstan wished to
maintain the American base on its territory at Manas.
After the events in
Andizhan in May 2005[4], and
in particular after the SCO summit in Astana, Uzbek-American relations reached
a crisis point.Tashkent did not limit itself to a verbal declaration as Bishkek
did, but actually made the USA close its base in Khanabad.This request was
granted at the end of November, 2005.For its part, Washington exerted pressure
on Uzbekistan in connection with the events in Andizhan, human rights
violations and the general situation in the country.Kazakhstan meanwhile, which
has no American bases on its territory, was able to set an example of
“brilliant political distancing,” having encouraged the anti-American démarche
on the one hand, while doing nothing to significantly aggravate relations with
the USA (or NATO) on the other.
At the end of October
2005, the regular session for the Council of Heads of Government (Prime
Ministers) was held in Moscow.At this meeting, Beijing attempted to steer the
development of the SCO toward strengthened economic cooperation.The Chinese
Premier, Wen Jiabao, declared that China was prepared to put US$ 900 million
toward financing joint development projects.The Chinese were essentially
proposing to heavily subsidize the economies of SCO countries, attempting to
transform the political organization into an economic one: a proposal that was
rejected by Kazakhstan and Russia.Had the Chinese solution been accepted, there
would have been a danger of the SCO turning into a Chinese “economic
protectorate.” This scheme threatened Russia and Kazakhstan in particular since
the Chinese strategy had assigned them the role of rear energy bases, suppliers
of hydrocarbons and raw materials.
The fact that Central
Asia is becoming part of a new economic and geopolitical order taking shape in
Eurasia and Asia has recently been touted by certain commentators.This process
would be characterized by market expansion towards the countries of Southeast
Asia, China, Korea, India, Turkey and Russia, and a slowdown (even stagnation)
in Europe’s economic development - traditionally a guiding beacon for many
countries of the CIS and Russia.Strengthening the “Asian” paradigm and
consolidating Eurasian independence (should Russian and Central Asian
integration projects be implemented) could have far-reaching strategic consequences.
Events of recent years
have shown that the SCO has begun to follow the same path as other regional
organizations, namely, it is becoming more institutionalized and bureaucratic.A
Secretariat with headquarter function has been set up in Beijing; the
activities of the Council of Heads of Government and Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs are organized; cooperation is underway between Security Council
secretaries, and an executive committee for RATS has been established in
Tashkent.The creation of a Development Fund and an SCO Business Council are
telling of the member states’ will to reinforce the economic aspect of the SCO.
However, many observers
are distrusting and skeptical of efforts by SCO founders to present their
organization as an element of the multipolar world and a modern geopolitical
power.According to these, the SCO is little more than a colossal act of
geopolitical bluff.The fact is that the “two main wheels on the SCO cart” - in
the words of the Uzbek president Islam Karimov[5]-Russia and China, have
been trying to use the SCO in their relations with the USA and the West for
their own advantage.They only use the SCO to “fly their flag” in Central Asia,
in face of a mounting American presence there.
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and
China’s Interests in
Central Asia[6]
The SCO has its
geographical and political peculiarities[7]. It
combines two major world powers and four smaller Central Asian countries, which
are unequal in terms of their political, economic, military, demographic, and
social potential, thus composing a 2+4 organism.
The SCO may evolve into
one of the four following scenarios[8]. First, it may develop
into an anti-Western alliance, say, an anti-NATO.Second, it may expand to other
countries (Mongolia, India, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.), though this is unlikely
to happen.Any expansion of the SCO will result in complicating its political
and organizational structure.Third, Russia and China may establish joint
control over their Central Asian partners as the SCO is intended to balance the
interests of both powers in Central Asia by involving other countries in the
game.Forth, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization may be given an
independent role within the framework of the SCO that will confirm the SCO’s
political orientation towards Central Asia.
Beijing believes that all
international forces in Central Asia may equally cooperate with the SCO[9]. 16 Each side of this
triangle has its own interest in the resources of the region[10]. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization has diversified its activity; however,
Beijing insists that its main objective is the fight against terrorism.It is
believed that the SCO is a provisional structure for China while it is
developing into a central world power.When this happens, China is very much likely
to treat other countries, and primarily its neighbors, harshly.
China has tried to dispel
the worries of its weaker Central Asian neighbors and focused on antiterrorist
activity as a common objective, thus promoting its image of a new superpower
with no aggressive plans.China’s representatives regularly meet with prime
ministers, presidents, generals and other diplomats of neighboring countries in
order to build up China’s image abroad and to maintain strategic diplomatic
relations.China tries to establish a subtle version of hegemony over its
neighbors.
Beijing understands that
economic, commercial and industrial cooperation with Central Asia, where the
main conditions are determined by China, would be much more effective and
farsighted.Trans-boundary rivers provide a strategic leverage for Beijing’s
policy in neighboring countries (first and foremost, in Kazakhstan).For this
reason, Washington loses its dominance in Central Asia to Beijing, despite
locating its military bases in the region and having a huge financial
potential.
China is the only Central
Asian country outside of the CIS, which is able to help its neighbors to fight
against regional extremism supported by international terrorist organizations.
However, the future
economic cooperation between China and Central Asia has a low potential since
their commercial relations have apparently been extended to the utmost and
China’s investment potential, which is the main interest of its Central Asian
partners, is rather limited.This leads to delaying the implementation of
projects, which have already been prepared, for example, in communications.At
the same time, China’s growing need for raw materials and energy resources may
result in increasing investments by national Chinese companies in the oil and
gas sector of Kazakhstan and the hydropower industry of Kyrgyzstan (for supply
of electrical power mainly to Xinjiang).Regarding Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan, they seem to remain a secondary economic interest of China.
U.S.military presence in
Central Asia, which serves as a military support for China, is a serious threat
to China’s security in the eyes of official Beijing.However, Beijing lacks the
means that would allow it to prevent its neighbors from cooperating with the
U.S.and other NATO members on military and political issues, including military
presence.Now, an important task for China is to hamper Central Asian countries
from being involved in the confrontation between Washington and Beijing,
i.e.from taking any part in anti-Chinese coalitions.
As a «regional player» in
the past, China is becoming an important factor in international relations.Its
relation ship with the U.S., Europe and Russia will be built on issues of
global and regional security and will directly affect the interests of
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries.However, the economic development
of China has its negative trends, which should be taken into account when
developing a long-term strategy for dealing with this power.
Russia is trying to avoid
direct confrontation with the U.S.and to concentrate on meeting strategic
challenges faced by development processes in the country.This makes Beijing
keep a low profile in its relations with the U.S., including regional concerns,
and focus on protecting its top-priority interests, mainly Taiwan and
suppressing possible external support to Xinjiang and Tibet.
It is very important for
Eurasian countries, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, to understand that by
establishing large colonies of its emigrants, which have economic and political
influence and are closed nationally and socially, China is pursuing an
important goal in its foreign policy.
China also plays an
increasingly active role in regional political forums where it has two
priorities.The first set of events are those where China is becoming
increasingly active, but not a leading player, for example, the ARF (ASEAN
Regional Forum), the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia, and
ASEM.The second set of events are those where China’s role is number one or two,
after an obvious leader, for example, the SCO where China is actually the
motivating force, and the six-party talks on North Korea, which would hardly
progress without Beijing’s constant pressure on Pyongyang.However, in pursuit
of its traditional careful and step-by-step tactics, China does not declare its
aim to take the leading position in these events and gives ground to Moscow and
Washington, respectively.
In the near future, China
is expected to start boosting its regional economic relations with other
countries, aiming to maintain its economic growth, to increase its political
and economic influence on the regional organizations it takes part in, and to
implement energy and communication projects in Siberia and Central Asia.
In the medium-term, China
will try to become a leader in such organizations as the SCO and ASEAN and to
form the Economic Cooperation Organization in Northeast Asia (with Japan and
South Korea) where it will also play a leading role.It will also try to
strengthen its economic and demographic influence on the Far East, Mongolia,
Siberia and Central Asia.
It is certainly the case
that China is isolated within the SCO, confronted by a block of post-Soviet
states that share a common past and confronted with the same problems, which facilitates
understanding among them.Moreover, Russia has a specific, tried-and-tested
approach to each of them.
A number of factors
define China’s interests in the SCO.Firstly, Beijing is attempting to restrain
the separatist forces of “Eastern Turkestan”[11]; secondly,
it is trying to preserve Central Asia as a stable and strategic base; and
thirdly, it views certain countries in the region as both potential suppliers
of energy resources and economic partners.One of China’s main goals is to
prevent this region from becoming a base for separatist groups and a channel
for their links with international terrorism.China is therefore proposing that
the governments of CA republics ban these separatists from carrying out any
activities on their soil and prevent any elements of this terrorist and
extremist structures from entering Chinese territory.Beijing is working on the
assumption that the security of CA states is interrelated with the security of
the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region (XUAR): in other words, any instability
in Central Asia will affect the security of northwest China[12].
Beijing’s success at
ensuring that CA remains a stable and strategic base depends on three
things.Firstly, it depends on the solving of the contentious border issues
between China and other countries in the region, as well as establishing peace
and security in border areas.Both of these problems are nearly solved: all that
remains is to reach an agreement on certain unpopulated and insignificant bits
of territory near the border.Secondly, it is contingent on the countries of
Central Asia engaging in open foreign policies with regard to China which, in
turn, must establish balanced bilateral relations with them.Thirdly, Central
Asia must not be under the thumb of any superpower.
The Chinese strategy in
Central Asia is not currently entirely autonomous, but determined rather by the
Russian and American positions[13]. As
far as Beijing is concerned, further development of the region’s situation
will, to a large extent, depend on the duration of the US’s military presence
there.China is therefore planning to build its strategy in Central Asia around
the SCO by strengthening its position and refining its decision-making
mechanisms, and by limiting institutional inertia in order to make it a tool for
transforming the region as a whole.
It has not escaped the
Chinese political and military establishment that, over recent years, Russia
has undertook a “return” in Central Asia by asserting its military presence and
political influence there.To them it is clear that Russia’s deepened economic
integration within the CIS is intended to increase its political
influence.China is therefore trying to limit Russia’s return to the region and
to contain it via the SCO.Considering Russia’s diminishing economic clout,
China sees its own growth as the main engine capable of providing a model for
the whole region’s development.Consequently, the SCO appears at present to be a
transitional structure for China, while it attempts to establish itself as a
global power center.It is also clear that China will do everything it can to
prevent the erosion of the SCO as a tool for spreading its presence in the
region and for balancing the relations between China and Russia.Beijing’s main
difficulty is to find a way of coordinating the SCO’s antiterrorist action with
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which has the same vocation and
includes all SCO countries but China and Uzbekistan.
Meanwhile, China has been
trying to dispel the worries that the weaker Central Asian neighbors have in
its regard, promoting counterterrorist measures and furthering its image as a
peaceful superpower.In so doing, China is attempting to establish some
semblance of soft hegemony.Considering China’s growing energy demand, it is
assumed that Chinese state companies will vastly increase their investments in
Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector, and strengthen their participation in
Kyrgyzstan’s hydraulic power sector (mainly with the aim of supplying
electrical power to Xinjiang).
Russian Vision on SCO
For Russia, the SCO is
above all a framework for cooperation with China.The scale of cooperation
between Moscow and Beijing reached unprecedented levels in 2005.Russia and
China held a series of joint large-scale military exercises, made a joint
declaration on world order in the 21st century, and have used the SCO to
counter US military presence in Central Asia.
The Russian military
community views the promotion of cooperation with China within the framework of
the SCO as indispensable, but remain divided over the extent of such strategic
military cooperation in light of possible rivalry between the two.The Russian
General Staff does not consider China to be a reliable partner, and refuses to
sell certain military equipment and technologies deemed too sensible.Russia is
also unwilling to sell China any kind of license to manufacture complex arms
systems.Moscow is clearly becoming concerned about the growth of Chinese
influence in Central Asia and the region’s increasing dependence on China.As
mentioned previously, Beijing’s attempts to transform the SCO from a political
organization into an economic one have not been reciprocated by Moscow.
Russian analytical
circles are currently working on a formula for cooperation with China within
the framework of the SCO.In particular, they are attempting to rethink the
internal structuring and functional specialization of SCO members, based on the
conventional 2+2+2 model, with China and Russia at the top level; Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan at the middle, regional level; and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at
the bottom, subregional level.For the purposes of functional improvements, they
would not exclude the possibility of classifying Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as
leading SCO subjects, responsible for stability and development in the region
in the context of the Central Asian “Four,” while Russia and China would assume
the SCO’s general strategic path, as well as its relations with the rest of the
world.
Russia clearly fears the
threat of becoming China’s junior partner.Consequently, Moscow is taking a
series of steps: by restricting the sale of new technology, by limiting
regional economic integration, and controlling immigration.It is also with this
in mind that Moscow is reinforcing trilateral relations between Russia, India
and China.
To a large extent, Russia
seems to view the SCO as a temporary geopolitical instrument in the spirit of
the Primakov doctrine[14], in order to maximize the
convergence of points of view with China.The proximity of the two countries
helps Russia and China to coordinate their positions in the international
arena.Furthermore, Moscow believes that a stance coordinated with China cannot
be ignored by the international community.Russia today believes it has a unique
opportunity to restore its geopolitical influence in Central Asia.Russia has
managed to merge the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) and the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc)[15] and,
by so doing, it has effectively taken control over the integration processes in
the region.In reality, this was an attempt to find an answer to Chinese
economic expansion in the region.
Russia’s strategy
regarding Kazakhstan, at least in the short term, essentially overlooks the
framework of the SCO.It aims rather to achieve a joint defense area, completing
a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) under its aegis, continuing the
process of further integration with the economic and military structures of
CTSO member states, and forming an integration core (on a Central Asia level)
around Russia and Kazakhstan.
SCO - Challenge to the
West?
The USA clearly plays a
role in the evolution of the SCO insofar as the two leading powers of the
organization - Russia and China - have close strategic and economic (counter-)
relations with Washington.The USA has a presence in Central Asia and
influences, to varying degrees, the foreign policies in the region’s countries,
primarily in Kazakhstan.
Since 2005, American
strategy in Central Asia has undergone radical change.The essence of this
change is that Washington was forced to come to terms with the fact that its
influence is on the wane there, and as a consequence, of its need to adopt a
more realistic policy.In the case of Kazakhstan, this more realistic policy
manifested itself for example in the non-intervention of the 2005 presidential
elections.In the preceding months, there was a very real threat that the USA
could have recourse to a “color revolution” in Kazakhstan.A number of factors
contributed to offsetting this threat: Astana’s decisive reaction to events in Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan, its concerted consultations with Moscow and Beijing, the change
in the electoral calendar, as well as the joint démarche by SCO members in July
2005, when SCO participants raised the issue of the American military presence
in the region.Consequently, it was the unequivocally frank position held by
Moscow and Beijing that became the strongest limiting factor with which the USA
was forced to contend.
It is assumed that a
review of certain previous methods and instruments for implementing American
policy in the region is currently underway, all of which will inevitably have
repercussions on Kazakhstan’s security.The goals of the US strategy in Central
Asia and their means of implementation are currently the subject of heated
debate in the American establishment.In 2005, a new strategic approach to the
region was developed in Washington - the “Great Central Asia” (GCA) project[16]. The
GCA project also had concrete political goals: to separate Central Asia from
the Eurasian region, of which it appears to be a natural part, and in sodoing
isolate the countries of the region from Russia and the CIS as a whole; setup a
“buffer zone” between the region and China; and creating a series of
communications routes from the Caucasus to Pamir that avoid Russian and Chinese
territories, etc.In short, the GCA plan can be perceived as a plan set up to
counter the SCO.
From an institutional
point of view, this project manifested itself in the redistribution of
responsibilities within corresponding departments of the US State Department:
in autumn 2005, Central Asia was transferred from the European department’s
area of responsibility to the department in charge of the countries of the
Middle East and South Asia.The new American strategy (as voiced by the US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice during her visit to the region in October 2005)
simultaneously takes into account several geopolitical, military-strategic and
regional factors.With regard to Russia and China, the US has decided to act in
accordance with the interests of these powers in the region and is prepared (if
only formally) to consider this as well as acknowledging the influence of the
SCO.At the same time, the USA insists on its presence in Central
Asia.Consequently, a departure (at least in words) from the previous unilateral
approach of the USA is becoming clear.
The trend towards NATO -
and more precisely, the rehabilitation of the armies of Central Asian states -
is a new tool in the process of strengthening the influence of the USA and the
West.In recent times, cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and
NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) has gained
increased attention.Moreover, the idea that the best way of modernizing Central
Asian armed forces is via this Partnership is gaining ground.This idea - which,
objectively speaking, is very sensible - has nevertheless caused irritation and
concern in Russia, as it indirectly threatens the functioning and credibility
of the CSTO and the SCO.
NATO’s strategic aims (in
the context of US strategy) include maintaining stability across the huge
expanse of Eurasia that lies east of Europe, as well as supporting geopolitical
control of strategically significant regions in the Middle East, the Black Sea,
Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Central Asia.Central Asia and Afghanistan have a
special place in this lineup, being key regions for NATO to establish its
geopolitical presence in the center of Eurasia, in terms of the impact they
might have on Russia and China.NATO strategists, evaluating Kazakhstan’s
current foreign policy, believe that Astana is taking a conscious risk in its
relations with Russia and China, aiming to strengthen its relations with NATO
slowly but surely over the long term.On this basis, NATO is quick to underline
Kazakhstan’s dual obligations with the CSTO and SCO, as well as in its
bilateral relations with Russia and China.It is therefore trying to enter the
fray of Astana’s balancing act.
The European Union is
almost entirely absent from the geopolitical scene in Central Asia.This applies
to both EU strategies concerning Central Asia as a whole and the level of
political activity from individual member states.At the current time, Europe is
able to influence Central Asia only indirectly, via the OSCE and NATO for
example.This is largely due to the dramatic slowdown of EU integration after
the failure of the constitutional project, but also to the EU’s recent
enlargement, the developments in Ukraine, the change of power in Germany, and
the transformation of relations between the EU and Russia.In regard to NATO,
the question is how the US strategy will be coordinated with its European
allies.It is clear that the EU strategy regarding Central Asia and Kazakhstan
has been determined by prominent individual European powers (France, Germany,
United Kingdom), but also by international organizations - namely NATO and the
OSCE.The EU is presently very important for Kazakhstan’s economy, but it does
not carry the weight of a geopolitical and military-strategic force in the region.
For the time being, the
EU is in retreat in Central Asia, satisfied in considering it a “buffer zone.”
The EU will therefore encourage (using various tools such as NATO and the OSCE)
this role for Central Asia, as buffer against the dissemination of threats
against European interests: terrorism, drug trade, illegal migration, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction being prime example.
However, this approach
has one important distinguishing feature: in contrast to the USA, the EU has
always acknowledged Russia’s particular interests in Central Asia.European
strategists are also considering ways to further their relations with the
region.In this respect, the Turkish problem is reviving, since building and
developing formal alliances between the European Union and the Turkic states of
Central Asia will depend on, though not be limited to, decisions made regarding
the admission of Turkey to the EU and on the stances taken by Beijing and
Moscow on this issue.
Some European strategists
have not ruled out the possibility of agreements being concluded with
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and “democratized” (i.e.post-Karimov) Uzbekistan along
the lines of the Lomé and Euromed agreements.Although these agreements do not
offer any prospect of entry or associate membership of the EU, they imply more
intense contact between partners in economic, customs and various other
spheres.
However, the EU’s
strategy regarding Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus - still
considered in Brussels as a single entity, will take as a starting point the
demand for energy and natural resources, combining this approach with the
doctrine of defending human rights and enforcing democratization.
Because of aggravated
situation in Central Asia and the increasing threat to national security,
Kazakhstan intensifies its relations with the EU.At the same time, Europe
expresses keen interest in the region.Nevertheless, it is necessary to note
that the EU does not have any strategies with regard to Central Asia.Big
European states have different economic and political interests in this
region.This connects with the internal peculiarities of European policy and
the general geopolitical situation, including relations between the EU, the
U.S., and Russia.At the same time, the events of 2000 and 2001 demonstrated
that the prevailing theme in relations between Europe, Kazakhstan, and Central
Asia was the problem of regional security and the fight against terrorism and
drug trafficking.After 9/11, the decisive factor in the development of European
policy toward Central Asia was Afghanistan.The crisis of 2001 increased the
urgency of the issue of how to terminate Europe’s dependence on Arabic oil.The
events of 9/11 transformed the search for hydrocarbons in the Caspian region
into a real policy of high-priority significance.In the future, this factor
will define the development of relations between Kazakhstan and some European
states, and the European Community on the whole.
In this environment,
there are several important implications for the West and the European Union in
particular, concerning radicalism and terrorism in Central Asia: 1.Develop
skills, especially in the intelligence community, in understanding the
ideological framework of the radical and terrorist groups.2.The radical and
externally sponsored Islamic movements and organizations existing in the region
offer little hope for a meaningful dialogue.Instead, it is the moderate
majority and the secular parts of the population, that should be engaged in
dialogue.3.The West needs to support reform-minded officials within
governments, not just anti-government forces.The West needs to find points for
collaboration within the governments, to support progressive groups and work
toward evolutionary change.
4.The link between drug
trafficking and religious extremism is proven beyond doubt, and the majority of
demand for drugs arises from EU countries.Lending major financial support to
counter-narcotics would hence be a major effort in fighting militancy and
terrorism.5.The EU should promote continental trade across Central Asia and the
Caucasus, which would bring new economic opportunities to these populations and
reduce the appeal of radicalism.6.EU educational exchanges should increase, and
extended to the provinces, including those experiencing Islamic radical
movements.7.The EU should focus assistance on the delivery of governmental
services to deprived areas, and in general, on greater degrees of
decentralization and self-government.8.Further, the EU should treat the issue
of support for extremism in Central Asia, including Afghanistan, and the
Caucasus as a subject for bilateral discussion with relevant Arab states and
Iran.9.The EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is
relevant to understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and
open democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and
militant Islamic political ideology.To this end, the EU should engage Turkey as
it addresses issues of Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus and Central Asia[17].
Through the SCO,
Kazakhstan remains at the mercy of the evolution of the Sino-Russian
relations: on the one hand, excessive strategic rapprochement between Beijing
and Moscow threatens to establish a double dictate of these powers in Central
Asia (including within the framework of the SCO); conversely, however, there is
also the danger of a flare-up in Chinese-Russian rivalry in the region, which
cannot be ruled out in the future.
The problems that China
presents for Kazakhstan are traditional ones and must be conceived of while
bearing the long-term in mind: demographic penetration, China’s growing
economic influence and the threat of Kazakhstan becoming economically dependent
on China, as well as growing conflicts between Beijing and other major powers.Yet
China’s strategy and policy is rapidly changing—which demonstrates an active,
offensive vision for the future of CA and its relations with China.Needless to
say, Beijing considers itself, in the medium term, the lead power and economic
protector of the region.This kind of strategy on the part of China will, in the
future, inevitably aggravate Chinese-Russian relations and could shift the
style of relations from one of cooperation to one of rivalry over the right to
be the major acting force in the region.
The SCO in the mode seen
in Moscow and Beijing may become another sizable challenge to the development
of Kazakhstan.That is to say, as an influential international organization of
geopolitical dimensions, in which China and Russia will undoubtedly dominate,
Central Asian states are likely to be assigned the role of “the guided.” In
view of this trend, it is logical for Kazakhstan, as far as possible, to work
on maintaining a tacit alliance with the post-Soviet states within the SCO with
a view to neutralizing the influence of China.At the same time, Astana must
continue to be Russia’s leading partner out of all member states.This means
coordinating with Russia on major energy projects linked with China.
It appears that
Washington will transfer its focus to cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO,
and not only with a view to matters of security, but to the broader
spectrum.Under these circumstances, Astana is in a difficult position, since
expanding cooperation with NATO will inevitably antagonize Moscow and China, as
leading powers in the SCO.On the other hand, Kazakhstan cannot, with long-term
prospects in mind, afford to forego full cooperation with the West for the sake
of the SCO.
The SCO is thus an extremely
ambiguous organization: it is not a military-strategic alliance, nor a
full-fledged economic union, nor is it a political organization in the
traditional (geographical, cultural-civilizational, and so on)
sense.Nevertheless the SCO holds an increasingly prominent place in
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, even if this might be involuntary, mostly because
of the participation in it of powers such as Russia and China, which Kazakhstan
can evidently not ignore.The SCO’s Central Asian trend is another factor
compelling Kazakhstan to try and play a prime regional role.
In terms of Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy, the SCO holds risks as well as benefits.Because this policy
relies on a clear balance of influences (or “multi-vectored”), the SCO presents
Kazakhstan with added options in its dialogue with the West.However, the many
priorities of the SCO proposed (or imposed) by Moscow and/or Beijing are
inevitably a burden for Kazakhstan.Membership of the SCO thus creates yet more
difficulties in terms balancing Russia and China, as it is likely that, in the
future, Astana will have to choose between them.
In the end, Kazakhstan is
not reaping any real benefit from its membership in the SCO, for the
organization has practically no bearing on Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations
with either Russia or China, nor does it help advance any particular issue.For
example, Kazakhstan has been as of yet unable to gain any concessions from
China on such weighty problems as the use of cross-border rivers.The SCO’s
potential in the area of security therefore remains mostly abstract and
provides no real guarantees.
In conclusion, taking into
consideration all of the objective and subjective factors, the prospect of
creating an effective regional organization derived from the SCO’s development
seems extremely hazy.In any event, the main issues are solved at the bilateral
level.And even if the SCO did succeed in developing into such an effective
organization, the China’s extraordinary growth would confine the other member
states into little more than a supply-base for China’s natural resources.The
organization would then risk becoming an “economic trap” with foreseeable
consequences in terms of their political sovereignty.This threat is, as yet,
hypothetical.But even today the SCO embodies more challenges and risks for
Kazakhstan than it does benefits.
Conclusion
The nations of Central
Asia, surrounded by Russia, China, and South Asia, comprise the geopolitical
centerpiece of the Eurasian continent.Their location makes them both a buffer
and a passageway between East and West.Central Asia is a major energy
producer.The region is capable of reducing the world’s dependence on oil from
the Middle East.Central Asia is thus subject to crosscurrents of political,
economic, and military interests and pressures.It is also at the crossroad of
narcoterrorist traffic that originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The current security and
geopilitcial situation in Central Asia is strongly determined by some different
factors.The Western impact is now the one of most important.This impact is
realized by two major players which are the US and EU, and through some
political and military instruments.So, a stability of the region is depended on
whole general framework which includes Russian-Western relations, Sino-American
contradictions, European ambitions, Caspian economics etc.It is possible to
conclude that the future security of Central Asia will be managed by the West
and its agents, but it should be a kind of smart and flexible management which
should take into consideration the interests of Central Asian states, also the
real vital interests of other powers, first of all, that is Russia.Only this
condition is demanded to secure the stability in the region and to prevent new
real ‘Great Game’ in a sense of 19th Century’s
power rivalry and uncontrolled expansion.The unengaged expertise proves this
epoch is over.And mostly, the current Western presence in Central Asia in this
own form confirms this final thesis.
But, the security
perspective on Central Asia nowadays is absolutely not harmonic one.Unfortunately,
it is real to predict for today some sources of danger and instability.That is
a minimum of threats which the external powers and regional actors should react
for.Uzbekistan with its enormous burdens of the social and economic problems,
inflexible political regime and growing Islamic pressure (as the “second wave
of indigenization”, according to Samuel Huntington) is certainly would produce
an instability for whole Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan after Akaev
demonstrates a chronic political crises, that is directly resulted by its
undeveloped social structures, clan and regional division, as well economic
disparity.Actually, this Central Asian state is trapped in “post-Soviet phase”
for long perspective.The forthcoming Kyrgyzstan’s development doesn’t inspire optimism.Tajikistan,
its economic, political and social structures are deeply involved and depended
on drug-traffic and drug-production business.This country is strongly impacted
from neighboring Afghanistan, and not only in drugs sphere.Turkmenistan remains
the enfant-terrible of Central Asia.The existence of despotic and exotic
Turkmenbashi regime was not ended after his physical death in December 2006 and
is flavored by Russian gas interests, the Western – particularly US –
tolerance, Turkish and Iranian support and Ashgabad’s self-isolation.
The prospects of Islamic
radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus remain unclear.On the one hand, it
is evident that radical groups do not have strong following in local
societies.In spite of repression, poverty, and foreign proselytizing, only a
minority of the population of the region appears to find the message of the
radicals appealing.What is worrying, though, is that this message appears
increasingly tempting to segments of the youth in the region.This does not
appear to be related to levels of economic development or the openness of
political systems.
Thus, regarding the
growing Russian and Chinese influence (within and without the SCO), the West is
challenged to find a stable and sustainable partner.For next perspective, only
Kazakhstan could play this role.Astana claims already now to be a regional
leader and to carry its portion of responsibility.However, Kazakhstan needs a
political, and more exactly – geopolitical support for its mandate.With its
economic progress, natural resources, political reforming and active new
national elite which was formed during the “Nazarbaev’s era”, Kazakhstan could
become a “center of geopolitical consensus“ among all major external actors.In
any case, for today Kazakhstan remains solely state in Central Asia which has a
real chance not to disappoint the West (“to fulfill promise”, according to
Martha Olcott).
The Caspian problem
represents the most uneasy challenge for Kazakhstan’s future.It touches upon
the republic’s relations with practically all big geopolitical players,
including Russia, the USA, China, Iran, and the European Union.Currently, the
situation in the Caspian is dependent on following factors: 1) the realization
of the BTC-Pipeline project; 2) the Russian new energy strategy (Garzprom
expansion); 3) the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program.
The main disputable issue
between Russia and the West will concern development of routes for the
transportation of oil from Kashagan.Russia attempts to block oil transportation
via the Caspian Sea by large-capacity tankers and through construction of an
underwater pipeline.Moscow’s purpose, according to western analysts, is
combination of Russian and Caspian oil into one pool under Russia’s
control.Along with direct economic dividends this will also provide a
possibility of political pressure over European consumers.Russia’s weak spot is
deterioration of Russian pipelines and their comparatively low carrying
capacity.In 2006-07, Kazakhstan confirmed its position that is to develop the
diversification of hydrocarbon export.
The current international
position of Republic of Kazakhstan is characterized by the following processes:
in the external political direction it maintains the policy of balancing
between great political power centers (versatile diplomacy).It maintains
relations with Russia on rather high level.With China Kazakhstan carries out
distanced and cautious policy using different mechanisms (SCO, CICA).The events
of 2001-2002 removed the most serious threat to security in Central Asia from
the militant Islamism for the coming future.In relations with the West it
reached temporary stabilization.The policy towards Central Asia as well as the
CIS develops mechanically over the recent years.Development of the Caspian continues
despite some political and geopolitical obstacles.The new correlation of powers
around Central Asia appearing as a result of formation of new geopolitical
situation threatens Kazakhstan with the appearance of new threats and
challenges to its security and stability.
Additional Bibliography
Akiner Sh., Aldis
A.(eds.) The Caspian: Politics, Energy, Security.– London: Taylor and Francis,
2004.
Amineh M., Parvizi M.,
Houweling H.Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security snd
Development.– Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004.
Areng L.The Caucasus and
Central Asia: Needs and Opitions for Stabilization.- Rome: NDC, 2002.– 123 p.
Armanini A.J.Politics and
Economics of Central Asia.– New York: Novinka Books, 2002.
Bacevich A.J.The New
American Militarism: how Americans are seduced by War.– Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.– 288 p.
Baran Z.The Challenge of
Hizb-ut Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology.–
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[1] This book is the continuation of our previous editions.See:
Laumulin M.The Security, Foreign Policy and International Relationship of
Kazakhstan after Independence: 1991-2001.– Almaty: KazISS and Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2002; New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: after
September 11 Eds.By M.Ashimbaev and M.Laumulin.- Almaty: KazISS, 2003; Laumulin
M.Central Asia and the West: the Geopolitical Impact on the Regional Security.–
Almaty: KazNU/KazISS, 2004.
[2] See Bobo Lo, “A Fine Balance: The strange case of
Sino-Russian relations,” Russie.Nei.Visions, No 1, April 2005.
[3] The Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 1992 by
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia and Tajikistan.In 2002, its
member states signed the statutes of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization in Chisinau and, in December 2004, the organization gained the
status of observer at the UN General Assembly.The purpose of the CSTO is to
prevent and end military threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty, as
well as cross-border threats such as international terrorism.
[4] On 13 May 2005, an uprising took place in Andizhan (Fergana
valley) and was brutally put down by government forces.The Uzbek government has
continuously denied that the revolt was peaceful and instead claimed that the
incident was an attempt to destabilize the government.They have turned down
requests for independent international investigations.Several Western states
have since distanced themselves from the country’s government and the EU has
imposed sanctions on it.
[5] See KontinenT journal, No 12, 2004.
[6] Refer to: Абдыкайева А.Шанхайская Организация
Сотрудничества как фактор стабильности в Центральной Азии // Казахстанв системе
международных отношений (Алматы).2001.С.124-127; ГуанчэнС.Шанхайская
организация сотрудничества в борьбе с терроризмом, экстремизмом и сепаратизмом
// Центральная Азия и Кавказ (Швеция).2002.№4.С.13-20; Калиева Д.Шанхайская
организация сотрудничества: перспективы развития //Analytic (Алматы).2001.№3,
С.37-41; Логвинов В.Шанхайская организация сотрудничества - качественный шаг
вперед // Проблемы Дальнего Востока (Москва).2002.№ 5.С.6-14.
[7] Sieh: Wacker G.Die „Schanghaier Organisation fur
Zusammenarbeit».Eurasiche Ge-meischaft Oder Papiertiger? - Berlin: SWP, 2001.-
41 S.; Malysheva D.China and Central Asia: the Role of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) // Central Asia and South Caucasus Affairs: 2003.Eds.by
B.Rumerand Lau Sim Yee.-Tokyo: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2003, pp.51-76.
[8] Толипов Ф.К вопросу о самостоятельной роли организации
центральноазиатского сотрудничества в рамках ШОС // Центральная Азия и
Кавказ.2004.№ 6.С.169-180.
[9] Xu Tao.Promoting «Shanghai Five» Spirit for Regional
Cooperation // Central Asia (University of Peshawar).No 49.Winter 2001,
pp.181-190; ПанГуан.Шанхайская организация сотрудничества в контексте
международной антитеррористической кампании // Центральная Азия и Кавказ.2003.№
3.С.55-61; Комиссина И., Куртов А.Россия - Китай - страны Центральной Азии //
Центральная Азия и Кавказ.2004.№ 2.С.175-182.
[10] Хамраев Ф.НАТО-ШОС: борьба с терроризмом и/или за влияние в
Центральной Азии // Центральная Азия и Кавказ.2004.№ 4.С.77-81.
[11] Name given by Turkic nationalists to the territory of the
modern Xinjiang Uigar autonomous region (XUAR), which is populated
predominantly by Turco-Islam people related to the peoples of Central Asia.
[12] Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia, and the U.S.: their
Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia”, Central Asia and the
Caucasus (Lulea, Sweden), 2004, No 5, p.116-125; No 6, p.86-94; Li Lifan, Ding
Shiwu, “Geopolitical Interests of Russia, the U.S.and China in Central Asia”,
Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lulea, Sweden), 2004, No 3, p.139-146.
[13] Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia, and the U.S.: their
Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia”, Central Asia and the
Caucasus (Lulea, Sweden), 2004, No 5, p.116-125; No 6, p.86-94; Li Lifan, Ding
Shiwu, “Geopolitical Interests of Russia, the U.S.and China in Central Asia”,
Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lulea, Sweden), 2004, No 3, p.139-146.
[14] In 1998-99, Y.Primakov, Russian Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister and a veteran of the intelligence community, tried to redirect Russian
foreign policy from West to East and give it a more anti-American and
anti-Western character.
[15] In February 2002 the Central Asian Cooperation Organization
(CACO) supplanted the Central Asian Economic Community created in 1994 by
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as economic cooperation
between these countries gave way to broader forms of cooperation (notably in
the field of fighting drugs, religious extremism, radicalism, etc).Russia
joined the organization in 2004.The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was
founded in 2001 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia and Tajikistan and
replaced the customs union of 1995.After Uzbekistan applied for membership in
the EAEC in October 2005, it was decided to merge the two organizations.
[16] See Starr F.S.E.A Greater Central Asia: Partnership for
Afghanistan and Its Neighbors.The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road
Studies Program, Washington, DC: Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy
Center, 2005, 38 p.
[17] Starr S.F.Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in
Central Asia.- Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk
Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 2006.
Nguồn:
Nguồn:
THE KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
THE GEOPOLITICS OF XXI CENTURY
IN CENTRAL ASIA
IN CENTRAL ASIA
Authors: Murat.T. Laumulin, Almaty - 2007
