Publication: China Brief Volume: 7 Issue: 23
December 13, 2007 08:52 PM Age: 5 yrs
Tehran is again on the agenda of the
U.S-China security relationship since the release of the recent National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that Iran had “halted,”
among other things, engaging in the development of nuclear weapons since
2003. President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
however, warned against removing the crosshair on Iran, insisting that
Iran continues to be “very dangerous,” a major “threat” and its nuclear
program can still potentially be used for hostile purposes. Iran,
therefore, has not escaped the eye of U.S. security storm. The United
States, European Union (EU) and the UN will continue to mull over a
solution for Iran—with or without Russia or China. China’s ambassador to
the United States, Wang Guangya, commented, “I think the [UN] council
members will have to consider that [NIE], because I think we all start
from the presumption that now things have changed” (Reuters, December
4). Iran, therefore, will continue to be one of the major issues or
opportunities for conflict or engagement between the United States and
China.
Three Common Interests
The United States and China do not often
see eye-to-eye on Iran, but have increasingly cooperated on the Iranian
issue in recent years. Iran was a major thorn in U.S.-China relations in
the early 1990s when the United States criticized China’s sale of
chemicals that could be used for developing chemical weapons in Iran,
and China’s “technological cooperation” with Iran on its civilian use of
nuclear technology. China stopped those programs with Iran in the
mid-to-late 1990s. Since then China has become a major part of the
international non-proliferation regime and joined almost all the
non-proliferation treaties, and additionally has moved closer in step
with the international community, including the United States, on the
Iranian nuclear issue. There has been notable progress in consultation
and cooperation, due to the fact that the two countries were able to
develop a common understanding and shared interests over the Iranian
nuclear issue. Since 1998, China has started to work with other
countries such as the UK, France, Russia, and the United States, as well
as the UN Security Council on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.
Moreover, the process of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear
issue brought the United States and China to the table with a common
purpose: prevent the escalation of tension and strengthen the regional
non-proliferation regime. Iran, in addition to North Korea, is one of
the major areas/issues for U.S.-China international consultation and
cooperation, working as “stakeholders” in maintaining international and
regional peace and security since the United States and China share
three converging interests in the Iranian nuclear issue.
The first is stability in the Middle
East—including the Persian Gulf. China and the United States share a
common interest in Middle East stability, since the two countries are
the biggest consumers of Middle East oil. The majority of oil imports by
the United States and China come from the region; with China importing
nearly 60% of its overseas oil imports from the Gulf. In order to ensure
stable and reasonable energy supply abroad, especially from the Middle
East, is a realistic and indispensable party to any national economic
and strategic security for the two countries now and in the future.
Thus, the peace and stability of Iran and other parts of the Middle East
are a common economic, security, and strategic interests of the United
States and China.
Second, non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) is already an established common interest of both
the United States and China. The spread of nuclear weapons is a
long-term threat to the international community. The more states or
non-state actors possess nuclear weapons, the higher the possibility
that some nation, regime, non-state actor or politician may wave the
nuclear card and heighten existential risks in unstable conflict
situations.
Third, terrorism remains a major threat
to the United States, China and other countries. The Middle East region,
and the bordering countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even
Central Asia, are the major source of terrorist forces threatening the
United States and China. Separatist forces using car bombs in China’s
Xinjiang and bordered areas of Central and Western Asia, is a major
national security threat, second only to Taiwan’s move towards de jure
independence. The connection and support to Xinjiang’s separatist forces
come mainly from Central and Western Asia.
These are the major common views and
interests between the United States and China over Iranian issues, and
they have been the foundation of U.S.-China consultation and cooperation
in recent years. Additionally, this foundation should serve as the
building blocks for the United States and China to continue to engage
and cooperate over issues related to Iran and the Middle East.
Notwithstanding, China and the United States seem to have more
differences than a consensus over their views and policies toward Iran,
especially concerning the nuclear issue.
Four Divergences
The first issue concerns the gap in U.S.
and Chinese “threat” perceptions. The Chinese and Americans have widely
differing perceptions about the threat or “potential threat” posed by
Iran, including possible Iranian nuclear weapons. To
Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike—Iran and its nuclear weapons
pose a very serious threat to peace and stability in the Middle East,
because of its threat to Israel and for American comprehensive
interests: oil, security, strategic, political in the region, and to the
American homeland. To Chinese government and military leaders, and to
the public, Iran—even a nuclear Iran—does not pose any direct or real
existential threat to China. Iran, in the eyes of the Chinese
government, is not “evil” or even a bad country or regime, and unlikely
to inflict harm on Chinese interests.
The second issue concerns the U.S.
“intelligence” fumbles. Largely as the result of the U.S. mishandling of
the Iraq war, the Chinese government has serious reservations about
American statements and intelligence about Iran—and the new NIE report
reinforces such perceptions that U.S. intelligence is not reliable. The
Chinese believe that there are differences between IAEA investigations,
assessments and conclusions, and American suspicion about the Iranian
nuclear program, as there were differences between the United Nations’
inspection team about its investigation about Iraq’s nuclear weapons’
program and U.S. claims before the Iraq War. Since the Chinese and
Americans always have differences about the facts of the Iranian nuclear
program and the Iranian threat, the two governments will logically have
disagreements on policies and timetable to deal with the contending
“reality.”
The third issue concerns historical
relations—or a lack thereof between the United States and Iran. The
Chinese see that the United States has not had positive relations with
Iran for many decades, so whatever the United States or the
international community do to Iran will not come at the expense of the
United States. In other words, the United States does not need to be too
cautious in dealing with Iran—including its nuclear program. On the
other hand, China has had a good and mutually beneficial relationship
with Iran for decades. To the Chinese understanding and worldview, Iran
is an important nation in the Middle East, a great civilization, rich
history and influence in the contemporary world. Iran is a positive
country to many Chinese, all in addition to the fact that Iran has been a
major source of Chinese foreign oil supply.
The Chinese government can afford to give
up some of its interests with Iran, but the big question is “why?” Why
should China sacrifice and bare the cost of deteriorating relations with
Iran？ Why is it necessary? Is it a fact that Iran is a serious threat
to the region or to the world that China must act with others against
such a threat? What are China’s incentives when it sacrifices its
relations with Iran? A single statement that since China needs to be a
“stakeholder,” so therefore it has to work together with the United
States or the “international community” each time they demand, to China
is not sufficient.
Lastly concerns China’s identity issue.
The Chinese leaders and people still seriously believe that China is a
developing country—albeit the biggest and fastest growing one in the
developing world. Therefore, the Chinese consider it a moral problem for
China when it comes to how it should position itself on international
issues. In the Chinese worldview, almost all the conflicting issues
today are issues between the two worlds: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Sudan,
Myanmar and others. So it is difficult for the Chinese leaders to
explain to their people why whenever there is a conflicting issue
between developed countries led by the United States—and a developing
country, China sides with the developed world and “bully” the smaller
and poorer country.
A Six-Party Framework for Iran
China would like the see “Six-Party
Talks” model used on the Iranian nuclear issue. Although the six-party
framework for the North Korean nuclear issue is not a perfect one and
even the Chinese are not too confident on the final destination of the
process to resolve the North Koran nuclear problem in the future. The
Chinese, however, do believe that the six-party talks is the best
approach available to deal with the problem peacefully, and insist it
should be given a chance, even though it might last for years. On the
Iranian nuclear issue, the Chinese believe in another “six-party”
process: the European Union (the UK, France, Germany), the U.S., Russia,
China, the UN, and Iran on the Iranian nuclear issue, may be successful
in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Just as it can get
approval now the UN inspection for more than ten years prevented Iraq
from actually having nuclear weapons after the 1991 Gulf War.
China may go along with some sanctions on
Iran, but that will only be when Iran walks away and refuses to come
back to the negotiation table of the six-party talks, or actually tests
nuclear weapons. Before that, every opportunity that the issue can be
resolved peacefully, and nuclear weapons can be prevented in Iran should
be seized.
That is the reason why the Chinese
leaders and the Foreign Ministry continue to state that China still
hopes to resolve the disputes on the Iranian nuclear issue
comprehensively “through continuing diplomatic negotiation,” even after
the release of the NIE report on Iran. China indicates it would continue
to hope that Iran implements those UN resolutions, cooperates with
IAEA, and continues to engage with the EU on the issue. China will
continue to work with all the other parties, including the United States
and Iran, to try to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. If the peace
process fails, then China will be ready for other options, including
more comprehensive and serious UN sanctions against Iran. Nevertheless,
before forfeiting to the “doomsday scenario,” if there is a chance then
no efforts should be spared to prevent it through dialogue, negotiation
and engagement.
Nguồn:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4612&tx_ttnews[backPid]=197&no_cache=1
Nguồn:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4612&tx_ttnews[backPid]=197&no_cache=1
