By: Richard Rousseau
Chinese leaders spend considerable time and energy in assuring the
international community that they have no reason to be afraid of China’s
“peaceful rise” and rapid emergence as one of the most important
economic and diplomatic players on the international stage. Many
countries, however, equate China’s growing economic might with greater
political influence and are less accepting of the benign image that
Beijing now wants to portray to the world. Although China’s current
policy may appear at first impression to be a rather soft variety of
imperialism, it is still perceived by many as “hard” imperialism.
There
are now mounting signs that other countries, especially China’s
neighbors, are not totally convinced of Beijing’s proclaimed benevolent
intent. Those countries are presently taking measures to protect
themselves in case China’s “soft” imperialism eventually turns out to be
more aggressive or of the “hard power” variety.
Evidence
of Beijing’s increasing political and economic strength can be found
practically on all continents, but it is most obvious throughout East
and South Asia. U.S. President Barack Obama found out right away in his
term that the fast-growing economic ties between China and Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam), South Korea, and Australia had important, but not always
positive, diplomatic consequences for the United States. While visiting
the region in November 2010, the President Obama soon realized that a
country like South Korea, a longtime U.S. ally, was annoyed by any
policy proposal between the two countries that might irritate Chinese
leaders. The Americans’ caution was salient despite Seoul’s vexation at
China’s refusal to go along with the imposition of punitive measures
against North Korea after it sunk a South Korean naval vessel and
shelled a disputed South Korean island in what proved to be a kind of
muscle flexing gesture.
There is nothing at all unusual about such
diplomatic standoffs in this neighborhood. Obama experienced similar
cool receptions in Indonesia and India during the same visit. There
seemed to be widespread belief among the leaders of these countries that
China’s power is waxing and America is losing its influence, and that
not antagonizing China has, therefore, become imperative in their
foreign policy.
At times the manifestations of Chinese power are
quite subtle, as in the case of various trade and investment agreements
between China and ASEAN countries. Such agreements benefit both parties,
but the terms seem more and more dictated by Beijing. For instance, the
Sino-Tajik agreement signed in January 2011, which ended a border
dispute dating back to the time of the Soviet Union, was not imposed
unilaterally by Beijing. However, it gave China sovereignty over more
than 1,000 square kilometers of land which formerly belonged to the
Soviet Union and which had been under the control of Tajikistan since
1991 – and it is highly likely, based on the assessments of energy
experts, that these areas hold important oil and gas reserves. It was
obvious to the Tajik government that the further development of economic
relations with China was conditional on making territorial concessions
in the disputed region.
China’s approach to this border dispute
with Tajikistan was a perfect example of how “soft diplomacy” can work.
However, analogous disputes with India and Japan are not being dealt
with in the same manner. Beijing continues to be utterly uncompromising
in its border dispute with India, a policy that led to an armed conflict
between the two countries in 1962. A small, but significant, incident
also occurred in January 2011, when the Indian government protested
against China’s issuance of separate visas to Indian citizens residing
in the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh – over which China
claims territorial rights. Beijing brusquely brushed off the protest
about its brash practice and reiterated its claims to the disputed area.
China’s
already firm stance on boundary disputes with Japan was even more
pronounced during the fall of 2010. In September 2010 a Chinese fishing
trawler deliberately collided with a Japanese coastguard ship near the
uninhabited islets called Senkakus in Japanese and Diaoyus in Chinese.
In response, the Japanese detained the vessel’s captain and crew. By all
accounts a relatively minor diplomatic incident, the ship collision
affair dramatically escalated when the Chinese government responded with
harsh denunciations of the detentions and violent demonstrations fueled
by these statements took place in many Chinese cities. Tokyo decided to
dilute tensions by releasing the crew, but to no avail. Beijing took
advantage of the situation to humiliate the Japanese government,
demanding both a formal apology and monetary compensation.
China’s
abrasive conduct during that episode was not the only element which
alarmed Japan and other East Asian neighbors. Equally distressing was
Beijing’s unyielding position regarding the disputed territorial waters.
Chinese officials acted as though there could be no doubt whatsoever
about the legality and legitimacy of their most expansive demands. That
hard line attitude was also patent regarding China’s assertive
territorial claims in the South China Sea. China’s stance, if taken
seriously, would give it the right to control vast territorial waters
currently considered international waters.
The extent of China’s
claims in the South China Sea has not only created unease among other
countries, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, but also in the
United States, the world’s largest naval power. Washington considers the
protection of the sea lanes in these waters as vital to U.S. national
interests. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly stressed these
concerns in her speech to an ASEAN conference held in July 2011 and
repeated them in more recent official U.S. State Department statements.
China’s
neighbors and the United States have also taken careful note of
Beijing’s willingness to flex its military muscles. It is highly likely
that Tokyo and Seoul’s decision to bury the hatchet over long-standing
disputes dating back to the time of Japanese colonial rule over the
peninsula at the beginning of the twentieth century was partly prompted
by China’s bullying toward Tokyo. Within weeks of the fishing vessels
incident, the two countries came closer to one another and approved a
set of bilateral security cooperation agreements. Common sense suggests
that the rapprochement between Japan and the South Korea reflects their
shared anxiety over North Korea. This factor undoubtedly pervades their
relationship, maybe even plays the leading role, but China’s growing
power is also a reality which make Tokyo and Seoul keep their guard up.
Another
indication that Beijing’s neighbors do not feel comfortable in the face
of China’s toughness is the steps they are taking to improve their own
military capabilities. Even Taiwan, whose incumbent President Ma Ying
Jeou was re-elected on January 14th, has expressed a desire to purchase
more weapons from the United States. During the January presidential
campaign, President Ma stressed that it is in the interest of Taiwan to
maintain close ties with mainland China and continue cross-Strait
dialogues; however, Taipei must engage in negotiation from a position of
strength rather than weakness.
Other East Asian countries are
also developing their armed forces to counterbalance China’s increasing
diplomatic and military might. Especially significant is the fact that
their military procurements are concentrated on their air and naval
systems – precisely the forces most appropriate to any eventual Chinese
threat in East and South East Asia.
China’s behavior is not
different from that of other rising powers throughout history: exerting
greater influence on its peripheral Asian neighbors and forcing weaker
states to cave in and make concessions. This is not surprising under
current geopolitical circumstances. Neighboring countries are also good
students of history and can grasp the repeating patterns. This explains
why they are trying to both accommodate the Chinese increasing clout and
make moves to counter China’s military strength. They are also doing
all possible to enhance their own ability to protect their immediate
national interests. The crucial issues, therefore, are how China will
react to the resistance from its neighbors and how its “soft”
imperialism will unfold over time.
This article appeared at Diplomatic Courier and is reprinted with permission.
About the author:
Richard
Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in
Baku, Azerbaijan. He teaches on Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics,
international political economy and globalization. He can be reached at rrousseau9@hotmail.com or rrousseau@khazar.orghttp://www.eurasiareview.com/29042012-china-spooking-allies-with-see-saw-between-soft-and-hard-power-analysis/
Xem bảng dịch:
