April 10, 2012
The next decade is likely to be the decisive period determining
the future course of U.S.-China relations. Unless China and the United
States can find ways to block the current drift toward strategic
rivalry, tensions will rise. This will make it more difficult to
preserve the climate of peace and prosperity that has fostered China’s
rise and made East Asia such a dramatic success story. Moreover, if
China's economy continues to surge ahead while the United States remains
mired in the struggle to bring its burgeoning budget deficit under
control, the PRC could emerge from this coming decade with the largest
GDP in the world. This will have both psychological and strategic
significance and could roil the waters of the bilateral relationship.
Recent US attention to East Asia, and particularly to Southeast Asia,
is part of a coherent U.S. policy approach in East Asia that seeks not
to contain China but to restore confidence in the region that the United
States, despite its budget difficulties, is truly committed to
maintaining a robust US presence in both Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia. Not surprisingly, this flurry of US activity is causing many
Chinese to see the United States as challenging China in its own
backyard. In reality, the situation is more complex.
China's more assertive behavior following the 2008 financial crisis
increased the desire of Beijing's neighbors for the United States to
remain engaged to play a balancing role. However, these same countries
worry that the United States may go too far in provoking China by
trumpeting U.S. determination to pivot back into East Asia. In addition,
America's closest friends and allies in the region share the concern
that the United States may become distracted by its domestic
difficulties and lack the staying power to remain fully engaged in East
Asia.
Such considerations underscore the fact that the credibility of US
policy in East Asia rests to a significant degree on effective
management of the US-China relationship. East Asians want the United
States sufficiently engaged to deter China from using its growing
military capabilities in inappropriate ways. At the same time, they do
not want the United States to rely excessively on the military component
of its regional presence or to behave in ways that make China a more
dangerous neighbor and increase pressures on them to choose between
China and the United States.
Both China and the United States have defined a framework for the
relationship that, in principle, should make these challenges
manageable. In the two US-China Joint Statements issued in November 2009
and January 2011, the United States welcomed a strong, prosperous, and
successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. Similarly,
China welcomed the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that
contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. In terms
of declared policy, therefore, the United States is not trying to hold
China down, and China is not trying to drive the United States out of
the western Pacific.
The question for both parties is whether they can adhere to these
positions over time as China grows stronger and more influential.
Beijing sees itself as again becoming the central player in East Asia,
while the United States has long been a Pacific power with formal
alliances and strategic ties throughout the region. Both Washington and
Beijing consider good bilateral relations of vital importance, but their
growing strategic rivalry has the potential to evolve into mutual
antagonism.
In particular, the Taiwan issue remains a highly sensitive factor in
the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Unfortunately, this issue is
presented domestically in China in a manner that undermines mutual
confidence and distorts the nature of the U.S. approach. Ever since the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing in
1979, U.S. policy on Taiwan has sought to minimize incentives for a
military resolution by continuing the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan
and to maximize incentives for a peaceful solution by holding firmly to a
“one China” approach and by consistently supporting every positive
development in cross-Strait relations. Developments over the last twelve
years have shown clearly that this approach provided an important
underpinning for the major improvements in cross-Strait ties that have
taken place.
Moreover, China and the United States will not be able to lessen
strategic mistrust unless and until they are prepared to address a
central question: is there an array of military deployments and normal
operations that will permit China better to defend its core interests
while allowing America to continue fully to meet its defense commitments
in the region? Neither country has yet shown any inclination to begin
exploring whether such an accommodation is possible. And yet this is
what needs to be done if we wish to avoid seeing history repeat itself,
to the detriment of both countries.
Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy is Director of the Kissinger
Institute on China and the United States. He retired from the Foreign
Service in January 2001 after a career spanning 45 years with the U.S.
Department of State.
