Chandan Mitra
Chinese economic aid to countries in the Indian Ocean region is aimed at securing political influence. India cannot afford to be a mute spectator.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/333247/Strategising-on-Indian-Ocean.html
Chinese economic aid to countries in the Indian Ocean region is aimed at securing political influence. India cannot afford to be a mute spectator.
India and the Indian Ocean are two inseparable entities. India owes its
geophysical existence to the Indian Ocean. Throughout history India has
been interacting with the lands and the peoples of its littoral states
through religion, culture and other means. There existed a certain unity
in the Indian Ocean for centuries till it was broken by the advent and
impact of the advancing European colonial powers after 16th century. The
exit of colonial powers — British, Dutch, French, etc — after World War
II made the countries of the Indian Ocean region refashion their
foreign policies keeping in view their national interests, the emerging
geopolitical realities and the dawning of the Cold War.
India, uniquely positioned at the centre of the Indian Ocean rim, opted for non-alignment as its foreign policy. It stood for making Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’. On the other hand India, started forging new relations with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Over the last 60 years, India is more engaged than ever in the region through trade, aid and financial assistance. In spite of the efforts made in this regard, a lot needs to be done and that can happen only if India encashes the needs of development-starved countries of the region. As an emerging economic and technological power, India is beginning to regard the Indian Ocean region as the core area of its foreign policy, and reinvent and reinvigorate that policy.
Today, the main security threats to India’s interests in the Indian Ocean region arise from three factors — first, the gradual erosion of its political influence in the area; second, the increase in Chinese presence in the region; and, third, the uncontrolled activities of Somali pirates.
Nowhere is the erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where despite assistance to Colombo in its successful counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, New Delhi has been unable to adequately secure either the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy. The negative state of affairs that India is confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting its interests in these island nations.
Fortunately, Indian interests still prevail in the Maldives despite an increase in political and economic contacts between that country and China. Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for meeting threats to its security, which presently arise from non-state actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and Somali pirates. It is still attentive to Indian interests. So is the case in Seychelles. Despite China’s offer of help to Seychelles to strengthen its anti-piracy capabilities, which it has accepted, Victoria continues to be as receptive to New Delhi’s offers of assistance and co-operation as it was before.
However, India has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Port Louis in February 2009. During the visit, he announced low interest credit worth $260 million to Mauritius to modernise and expand its airport. He also announced an interest-free loan of $5.9 million and a grant of 30 million yuan. Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said the two countries had discussed possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island’s congested capital.
Mr Hu Jintao pledged to speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius, creating 40,000 jobs. Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Mr Hu Jintao’s visit in February 2009, total Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted to $117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed $1 billion, a nearly 10-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.
The 521-acre economic and trade zone is an important part of what China calls the “going out policy” and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies operating in Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which China will construct outside Port Louis under this project.
Having seen the gradual erosion of India’s political influence in Sri Lanka, we are now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius. It used to be under Indian cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under India’s cultural influence, but the economic influence is more and more that of China. And, as China’s economic influence grows, so will its political sway over Mauritius.
The gradual decline in India’s political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region has been accompanied by a steady increase in China’s onshore presence in the countries of this region, mainly for helping them to develop their infrastructure — an airport and an economic and trade city in Mauritius; a commercial port and an international airport at Hambantota in Sri Lanka; the expansion and modernisation of the Colombo port; road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of Sri Lanka; the construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Burma; gas and oil pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa can be moved to Yunnan without having to pass through the Malacca Strait; and, the construction of a rapid rail system connecting Rangoon with Yunnan. Talks are on between China and Bangladesh for modernisation of the Chittagong port and for connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Burma.
For expanding and strengthening its political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region, China has two precious assets which India is not in a position to match either now or in the foreseeable future — huge cash reserves and vastly superior infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for infrastructure in these countries.
Even the best of navies will be only of limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in the countries of the Indian Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and influence, China has achieved a head start over India. The Chinese Navy still cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of our Navy in the Indian Ocean region, but China’s onshore presence and influence will pose increasing challenges to Indian diplomacy.
Periodic reports of a speculative nature regarding Chinese interest in the acquisition of a military base — particularly naval base — in the Indian Ocean region have not been corroborated. At present, China’s interest is in strengthening its economic presence. When the economic presence goes up, political influence will automatically increase. Yes, the Chinese have been developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma. One can see the beginnings of such a relationship with Bangladesh too.
Do these relationships form part of a well planned strategy to acquire a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean region? There is no evidence at present to validate this view. The Chinese focus, at the moment, is on establishing economic presence and political influence. Beijing’s willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships is a tactical move to achieve these two objectives.
Compared to their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. The Chinese do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the prominence presently enjoyed by the American and Indian navies in the Indian Ocean region. Their interests are presently focussed on protecting the security of their energy supplies and propping up Pakistan as a credible threat to India.
The entry of Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or the West. China’s concern over the threat from Somali pirates is accepted by countries of the region as well as the West as justified. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese Navy have enabled it to familiarise itself with operating conditions, initiate Navy-to-Navy relationships and offer Chinese assistance in capacity-building.
Will China use its anti-piracy forays as the initial building block for a long-term Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about China’s naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean as a follow-up to its assertiveness in the Pacific Ocean. Occasional voices are heard from the community of retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by both Beijing and the CPC. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.
Given the atmospherics, India — with its large maritime capacity — has attempted to play the role of an ‘unobtrusive fulcrum’ and a ‘balancer of power’ in the Indian Ocean region. It created the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 with enthusiasm from all participating littorals. Unfortunately, the focus of the movement seems to have got diffused as it meanders along meetings — the most recent one held in the United Arab Emirates.
Excerpted from Chandan Mitra’s lecture on ‘The Power Struggle in the
Indian Ocean Region’ which he delivered during a symposium at the
University of Sydney recently.India, uniquely positioned at the centre of the Indian Ocean rim, opted for non-alignment as its foreign policy. It stood for making Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’. On the other hand India, started forging new relations with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Over the last 60 years, India is more engaged than ever in the region through trade, aid and financial assistance. In spite of the efforts made in this regard, a lot needs to be done and that can happen only if India encashes the needs of development-starved countries of the region. As an emerging economic and technological power, India is beginning to regard the Indian Ocean region as the core area of its foreign policy, and reinvent and reinvigorate that policy.
Today, the main security threats to India’s interests in the Indian Ocean region arise from three factors — first, the gradual erosion of its political influence in the area; second, the increase in Chinese presence in the region; and, third, the uncontrolled activities of Somali pirates.
Nowhere is the erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where despite assistance to Colombo in its successful counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, New Delhi has been unable to adequately secure either the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy. The negative state of affairs that India is confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting its interests in these island nations.
Fortunately, Indian interests still prevail in the Maldives despite an increase in political and economic contacts between that country and China. Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for meeting threats to its security, which presently arise from non-state actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and Somali pirates. It is still attentive to Indian interests. So is the case in Seychelles. Despite China’s offer of help to Seychelles to strengthen its anti-piracy capabilities, which it has accepted, Victoria continues to be as receptive to New Delhi’s offers of assistance and co-operation as it was before.
However, India has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Port Louis in February 2009. During the visit, he announced low interest credit worth $260 million to Mauritius to modernise and expand its airport. He also announced an interest-free loan of $5.9 million and a grant of 30 million yuan. Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said the two countries had discussed possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island’s congested capital.
Mr Hu Jintao pledged to speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius, creating 40,000 jobs. Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Mr Hu Jintao’s visit in February 2009, total Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted to $117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed $1 billion, a nearly 10-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.
The 521-acre economic and trade zone is an important part of what China calls the “going out policy” and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies operating in Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which China will construct outside Port Louis under this project.
Having seen the gradual erosion of India’s political influence in Sri Lanka, we are now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius. It used to be under Indian cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under India’s cultural influence, but the economic influence is more and more that of China. And, as China’s economic influence grows, so will its political sway over Mauritius.
The gradual decline in India’s political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region has been accompanied by a steady increase in China’s onshore presence in the countries of this region, mainly for helping them to develop their infrastructure — an airport and an economic and trade city in Mauritius; a commercial port and an international airport at Hambantota in Sri Lanka; the expansion and modernisation of the Colombo port; road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of Sri Lanka; the construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Burma; gas and oil pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa can be moved to Yunnan without having to pass through the Malacca Strait; and, the construction of a rapid rail system connecting Rangoon with Yunnan. Talks are on between China and Bangladesh for modernisation of the Chittagong port and for connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Burma.
For expanding and strengthening its political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region, China has two precious assets which India is not in a position to match either now or in the foreseeable future — huge cash reserves and vastly superior infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for infrastructure in these countries.
Even the best of navies will be only of limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in the countries of the Indian Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and influence, China has achieved a head start over India. The Chinese Navy still cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of our Navy in the Indian Ocean region, but China’s onshore presence and influence will pose increasing challenges to Indian diplomacy.
Periodic reports of a speculative nature regarding Chinese interest in the acquisition of a military base — particularly naval base — in the Indian Ocean region have not been corroborated. At present, China’s interest is in strengthening its economic presence. When the economic presence goes up, political influence will automatically increase. Yes, the Chinese have been developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma. One can see the beginnings of such a relationship with Bangladesh too.
Do these relationships form part of a well planned strategy to acquire a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean region? There is no evidence at present to validate this view. The Chinese focus, at the moment, is on establishing economic presence and political influence. Beijing’s willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships is a tactical move to achieve these two objectives.
Compared to their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. The Chinese do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the prominence presently enjoyed by the American and Indian navies in the Indian Ocean region. Their interests are presently focussed on protecting the security of their energy supplies and propping up Pakistan as a credible threat to India.
The entry of Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or the West. China’s concern over the threat from Somali pirates is accepted by countries of the region as well as the West as justified. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese Navy have enabled it to familiarise itself with operating conditions, initiate Navy-to-Navy relationships and offer Chinese assistance in capacity-building.
Will China use its anti-piracy forays as the initial building block for a long-term Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about China’s naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean as a follow-up to its assertiveness in the Pacific Ocean. Occasional voices are heard from the community of retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by both Beijing and the CPC. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.
Given the atmospherics, India — with its large maritime capacity — has attempted to play the role of an ‘unobtrusive fulcrum’ and a ‘balancer of power’ in the Indian Ocean region. It created the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 with enthusiasm from all participating littorals. Unfortunately, the focus of the movement seems to have got diffused as it meanders along meetings — the most recent one held in the United Arab Emirates.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/333247/Strategising-on-Indian-Ocean.html
