Author: Chenchen Wu (the School of Government and
International Affairs, Durham University)
As global
demand for energy increases, major players like the United States, the European
Union, and Japan are facing competition from a new source as China struggles to
meet its need for long-term energy supply. China-Africa cooperation has
particularly been put in the spotlight. Some international observers accuse
Chinese foreign policy towards African countries of undermining international
efforts to increase transparency and good governance. Others describe a policy
of ‘an aid for oil strategy’ or even a ‘neo-colonial policy’. On the African
side, some blame on Chinese enterprises of underbidding local firms, especially
in the textile industry, or of failing to hire Africans. In Beijing, the
Chinese government insists on its ‘non-interference’ policy and refuses to link
business with the human rights issue. The Beijing Summit in 2006 accelerated
the interaction between China and Africa even further, as the two sides decided
to accelerate cooperation, especially in joint resources exploration and
exploitation.
This
research paper, divided in two parts, aims to provide insights into the status
of the Sino-Africa relationship and gives a relatively objective conclusion.
Part one considers the policy level, examining the past relationship from the
‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955, to
‘Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982, to ‘a New
Strategic Partnership’ in 2006. This concludes that China’s policy towards
African has moved away from unconditional assistance so that ‘mutual-benefits’
has become the priority. Part two examines the motivation level. Here I argue
that China’s policy to Africa is not only driven by oil and other resource
needs, but also the strategic importance of the African continent, which lies
in three considerations, with commercial factors and diplomatic issues standing
alongside the resource imperative. Some African countries like Nigeria, Angola,
Sudan, have gradually become critical oil-exporters for China as extreme
instability of the Mid-East supply has increased. In particular, since China
and African countries are still developing areas, political cooperation in
international affairs is necessary as well as important to secure their shared
interests. Finally, I conclude that the cooperation between China and African
countries is on the basis of complementary trade, mutual-respect, and a concern
for increased influence for the developing world in international affairs,
including the global political economy. Nevertheless, as a ‘responsible and
rising power’, which is what China claims to be, China should take more actions
in certain scenarios to stand with, and eventually contribute to the leadership
of the international community.
·
·
Part I the Policy level
This
section debates the evolution of China’s African policy from the founding of
New China to the contemporary era, by means of three turning points: in 1955,
1982, and 2006.
i) ‘Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955
China’s
relation with Africa may be traced back to six centuries ago. In 1415, Chinese explorers visited the East
African coast and brought shiploads of Chinese commodities. Kenya provided many
local gifts as return. But the interaction in the modern time started from the
Bandung Conference held in the year 1955, which was widely regarded as a
seminal event in Sino-African history. The conference was expected to enhance
economic and cultural cooperation of the two continents and promoted the
anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle. Of the 29 states that participated
in the conference, six were African, such as Egypt, Libya and so on. The Former
Premier, Zhou Enlai, attended the conference and presented the Five
Principles of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, which covered mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful
coexistence (Looy, 2006:2). The achievement of great diplomatic success
followed the conference increased Chinese interests in the continent. In
1963, Premier Zhou embarked on his first ten-nation tour of Africa to promote
the second Asia-African conference. Though few agreed on the necessity for the
next meeting, Premier Zhou put forwards a particular ‘Eight-Principles’
that were designed to guide China’s engagement to African countries.These
principles clearly clarified the Chinese intention to assist African countries
by the policy of economic and technical aid. Moving into 1970s, China
significantly expanded aid projects in Africa, illustrated in the number of
recipient countries. (See table 1). Furthermore, the principles showed that
Chinese government provided the assistances to the African countries without
asking for any return, at least from an economic perspective. Some loans did
not require repayment if the recipients could not afford this. However, for
China’s decision-makers, the aid diplomacy had both political and ideological
objectives. On the ideological level, China seemed to support any revolutionary
movement against imperialism, including African revolutions. On the political
level, the primary motivation was to compete with Taiwan and then get African
to support the PRC in international recognition, as well as to compete with the
Soviet Union in the African sphere.
·
ii)
Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982
After the
most important political goal, the UN seat, was achieved in 1971, a mutual
diplomatic recognition between China and America was established in 1979. The
less intensive international environment was reflected in China’s foreign
policy so that economic growth and domestic reforms instead of revolutionary
goals dominated the policy agenda. The 12th Communist Party
Committee National Assembly in 1982 sent two messages that had implications for
China’s African policy: China would concentrate on domestic economic development;
China would pursue its independent foreign policy characterised with ‘mutual
benefits’ in real meaning (Li, 2007:72).
On the 1982 trip to the African continent, in accordance with these
changes, the Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang offered a wholly new ‘Four
Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’, which
stressed equality and mutual benefits, practical result, diversity in forms and
common development.
(Onderco, 2007: 5). If comparing the Four Principles of the 1980s to the
Eight Principles in the 1960s, a remarkable difference was that China
asked for mutual promotion of the two economies, as showed in principle 2 and
4. Indeed, economic assistance between the poor countries could not be
sustained in the long term if it was only limited to a one-way flow. By that
time, China was no longer interested in sustaining its position as an
influential player on the continent, but was eager to develop own economic
capability. In other words, Africa lost its importance in Chinese eyes and was
marginalized as China’s focus shifted to its own modernisation. In a period
when China itself depended on foreign funds, there was little that China could
do for Africa.
iii) ‘A New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006
The lull in
relations lasted until the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989. Though China intended to
focus its diplomacy with the developed countries, it was confronted with harsh
condemnation on human rights and punishment exemplified by political isolation
and economic sanctions. These made China aware of the insurmountable value
divergence between itself and the West. The only strategy seemed to be to look
back, and to strengthen ties with the developing world as a defensive
mechanism. This meant a reappraisal of the role of the third world countries,
including the ASEAN countries and African countries, which expressed their
understanding towards Beijing’s action in handling this internal problem. As
part of an effort seeking political assistance, the Foreign Minister, Qian
Qichen visited 14 African countries during 1989 and 1992. The tour highlighted
Beijing’s intention in seeking potential political supports from the African
side. During his 1996 national visit, President Jiang Zemin proposed building a
long-term and stable Sino-African relationship of all-round cooperation and
friendship geared towards the 21st century (China-Africa Friendship
and Cooperation in Five Decades, 2000).
In 2006,
Beijing government particularly released an important white paper, China’s
African Policy, to clarify Africa’s strategic importance to China. It was
‘the first of its kind in China’s diplomatic history with Africa’, which
embodied Chinese long-term plan of enhancing all-rounds cooperation with Africa (Li, 2007: 69). Through it, Beijing presents the
world that the objective of China’s African policy is to ‘establish and
develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa’ on the basis of
advancing the fundamental interests of both sides. The white paper captures the
Beijing government’s attempt to construct a strategic relationship with the
continent. What Beijing addresses repeatedly is mutual-benefit under the
framework of the strategic partnership. Apparently, the benefit here does not
just purely refer to the political gains in 1955-1978, or the economic
interests during 1978-1989. Instead, it established strategic goals through
pragmatic pursuits, including political cooperation, economic interactions, and
cultural exchange and so on, as showed in the white paper.
Part II Motivation level
In the context of China’s foreign policy,
there are three dominating objectives: national unification, the promotion of
world peace and an impartial world order, and the sustainability of economic
development (Payne & Veney, 1998:2). Others note that China’s development
strategy demands resource supplies and exports markets; that its diplomacy
requires support in the international organizations and through persuasion it
seeks allies to advance Chinese interests (Naidu & Davies, 2006: 70). In
other words, the People’s Republic of China is not interested in exporting
communist ideology; it is economic and political influences that occupy Chinese
attention. China’s foreign policy towards Africa is not exception to this.
·
i)
Resources concerns
When many
criticise ‘China’s colonial behaviour in Africa’, African countries
collectively have become an important trade partner, especially a reliable oil
exporter for China. Since the Asian Pacific area fails to provide abundant
energy resources to fuel Chinese economic growth, particularly after the
accession of the World Trade Organization, and the Iraqi War has further shaken
the already instable supply from the Middle-East region, China’s energy concern
has switched to African continent. The African countries figures on the agenda
of Chinese oil diplomacy due to several factors. Unlike the Middle East region,
the external power influences are less evident in the continent and African oil
industries are open to foreign investment.
Furthermore, African oil has the characteristic of low-sulphur content,
which is good for environmental protection; and its location in West Africa
makes for easy processing by Chinese refineries (Naidu & Davies, 2006:73).
Moreover, the historic links to liberation movements, the identity of the developing
countries, the shared understanding of human rights question, along with the
partnership based on non-interference policy have pushed the bilateral
cooperation forwards smoothly.
With the
political supports of their governments, the three largest national oil
companies in China, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China
National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil
Cooperation (CNOOC) have either operated new exploration deals with the oil
exporting countries, or have taken over the stakes in already-established
African oil companies. (See table 2). Other oil companies, like the Zhongyuan
Oil Company, PetroChina also strive to invest in the African oil sector. During
the process, China’s commercial banks sometimes act as credits-providers to
ensure the commercial activity. For instance, in 2005, China’s Export and
Import bank granted a 1 billion USD oil-backed loan to Angola, which was
increased to 3 billion USD in 2006 for upgrading of local infrastructure. The
increasing fund enabled Sinopec to secure concessions for the oil exploration
in the coming years (Naidu & Davies, 2006:76). Nowadays, African countries
have supplied approximately one third of China’s oil imports, increased from 11
percent in the year 1995, competing with the Middle East Region (See table 3).
Angola, the second-largest oil-producing country in the continent, has exceeded
the Saudi Arabia to become the top oil supplier, providing 17.46 percent of
China’s oil imports. (Zhao, 2007: 26, cited from U.S. Energy Administration;
Zhao Daojiong, 2006, China’s Oil Interests in Africa: International Political
Problems).
It is
apparent that China’s oil policy achieves a remarkable success in the
continent. Consequently, some scholars begin to purely link China’s African
policy with oil or energy, whereas others argue that China goes to Africa for
grabbing raw materials to gear its impressive economic growth. Although the two
theories could not portray the full picture of China’s African policy, the latter
argument seems more pragmatic. Chinese manufacturing sector has created massive
demand for cooper, aluminium, nickel, iron ore, oil and so on. Beside energy,
China’s importing list in Africa is long. China not only imports oil from
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, but also buys iron ore and platinum from South Africa,
timber from Cameroon, Congo and Gabon. China is in fact the world’s largest
leading importer of crude oil, iron ore, manganese, plastic materials, metal
ores, oil seeds, textile fibres, and pulp and paper; the second largest
importer of cooper, which is needed by China’s electricity industry; the
importer of 40 percent of world soy bean, and the consumer of 50 percent of
world wood. Importantly, the demands for these commodities will continue in the
foreseeable future, according to Deutsche Bank Research Report. (See table
4). As long as China continues to demand
the resource inputs, the interest in African continent will not wane as many
African countries have become major resource providers for China(Data from
Deutsche Bank Research Report, 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that the African continent has become a major contributor to China’s resource
imports basement.
ii)
Commercial considerations
Certainly,
of the immediate importance to China are Africa’s abundant resources. China
needs every primary product, in many people’s eyes. However, it is insufficient
to argue that China treats Africa purely as a resource base. It can be argued
that China’s engagement with Africa in the new century is characterised not
only by a need for economic resources, but more critically, by the commercial
deals and political muscles. In the released white paper, economic interactions
through preferential loans, financial cooperation, agricultural communication,
and investment in African infrastructure are included and given high weight. In
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), beyond
cooperation in resources, bilateral ties will involve not only agriculture,
trade, investment, but also infrastructure, science and technology. On the national visit of President Hu Jintao
to Africa, commercial deals include automotive works in Namibia, opening fruit
market to South Africa, expanding investments in infrastructure, telecommunication,
tourism in Seychelles, and increasing the number of duty-free commodities in
Mozambique (Africa-China: Hu’s Tour, 2007).
As a matter
of fact, China has been one of the three largest
trade partners with Africa, following America and France. The bilateral
trade is growing annually and rapidly, from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 733.11
billion USD in 2007. (See table 5). China has
acknowledged the export and investment potential in the continent. With 900
million potential customers, the African continent is a rather suitable market
for Chinese cheap but good quality commodities, such as textiles and
manufactured goods. The exports to Africa went up from 2.3 percent of the total
exports in the year 2001 to 3.1 percent in the year 2007. (See table 6). The
exports are mainly household utensils, mechanical and electric products,
textiles and clothes (Africa-China: Beijing Summit, 2006). Those countries with
large populations are the focusing markets, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and
Algeria. As Africa is not on the top 10 lists of China’s trade partner yet, and
the trade with Africa is only a tiny part of China’s foreign trade so that the
potential for both is massive.
In
terms of investment, from 2003 to 2006, China’s outward investment to Africa
had risen from 74.81 billion USD to 519.86 billion USD. It only took 2.9
percent of total Chinese overseas investment, although it covered 81 percent of
African countries (2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment). China has been investing in textile industries in the form of
joint venture with African enterprises in order to take advantage of the United
States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act and the European Union’s Cotonou
Agreement that is replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreement, which may
provide preferential clauses for textile and apparel goods of eligible African
countries into the American and European markets. In addition, Chinese
construction firms have been bidding for the construction deals in the
continent. The China Road and Bridge Corporation has set up the regional
headquarter in the Capital of Kenya and has been rebuilding the roads destroyed
in Civil War in Angola (Meidan, 2006:79). Other commercial plans include that,
a first group of overseas economic trade and cooperation in which three
countries of the group come from Africa: Nigeria, Mauritius and Zambia, and a
China-African Development Fund to provide start-up capital to Chinese companied
investing in Africa (World Investment Report 2007). Thus resource import sector
is only one part of an expanding trade and investment relationship between
China and Africa.
·
iii)
Political and diplomatic considerations
Some
analyses suggest that the China’s African policy has other intentions, such as
reforming the global order and advance resistance to hegemony, or to contain
Taiwan. (Taylor, 2006, 67-69). Though it is uncertain whether China’s intention
is to change or sustain the present global order, we can agree that beside
commercial factors, China’s African policy is also driven in a large part by
political motivations, not least the Taiwan issue and the pursuit of political
backing in the international society to promote the political environment for
China’s strategic goals. Africa has been a reliable and traditional ally to
China, if ignoring the short-term antipathy to China’s revolutionary ambitions
in the 1960s. Without the supports of the African group, China would not be
able to take over Taiwan’s seat successfully in the United Nations, and be
recognized by the international community. Nowadays, in such an international
system where civilization and hegemony have coexistence, political cooperation
in international community is a key for those countries that have similar
background and share similar interests.
So far China has more than once vetoed unfavourable resolutions to
certain African countries in the UN, while the African Union also defends China
against the human rights charge and Taiwan’s independence movement.
But in my
theory, the core of the bilateral political exchange is not to regain Taiwan,
but a common agenda in seeking the justice of world order and resisting
hegemony. Being a historic event in the bilateral diplomacy, the 1955 Bandung
Conference itself was expected to enhance cooperation of the two continents to
promote the anti-imperialist struggle. The First China-Africa Forum in 2000
proposed the construction of an international political and economic order. In
the 2003 China-Africa Forum, Premier Wen pointed out that ‘the hegemony is
raising its ugly head’, so that the collective power of the developing
countries is beyond necessity to secure their own interests in international
affairs. The white paper of China’s African policy in 2006 indicates
that ‘China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with
African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of
views, coordinate positions on the major international and regional issues and
stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national dignity and human right.’(China’s African
policy, 2006). In the same year, at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit
and Third Ministerial Conference, President Hu Jintao noted that China will
cooperate with Africa to promote balanced and harmonious global development,
to strengthen cooperation in international affairs.(Hu’s speech at the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit, 2006). It is without any doubt that the
regular forum meeting and frequent high-level visits were intended not just to
promote bilateral economic ties, but more importantly, to build a steadfast
political union between the two.
Part III Conclusion
China’s phenomenal economic growth is
driving the impressive trade, diplomatic, and aid relations with Africa, and
the significant engagement causes mixed reactions in the Western media and
diplomacy, which wonder about the nature of the China’s interests in the
continent. If looking inside the story, we can see that, in the past, the
bilateral relationships were shaped by the China’s anti- hegemony strategy,
combined with the competition with Taiwan. Today, pragmatic motives based
mainly on national interests have replaced ideology to guide the Sino-African
ties. From the economic perspective,
China and Africa have complementary economic and commercial needs. Africa is a
continent with rich-resources but poor manufacturing base and capital shortage.
They rely on imports, including in basic goods. In comparison, China has
sufficient capital, a well-established manufacturing export base, but they
depend on external resource suppliers. The cooperation between the two is in
accordance with the economic theory of comparative advantages, and certainly
both benefit from it. From the diplomatic perspective, China perceives Africa
as an important partner for coordination in the process of international rules
formulation. China’s claim of the identity of a developing country means that
it is viewed by the African countries as a reliable spokesman and champion to
ensure the shared interests in international organizations like the UN.
Moving to the strategies that China
applies to the African case, there are three major policies that help to win
the favour of the majority of countries: the policy of mutual respect without
asking any political concessions of the counterparts; symbolic diplomacy,
frequent high-level visits shows the world how important the continent means to
China, which indirectly raises the political value of Africa; and impressively,
economic diplomacy. Chinese investments are always accompanied by related
infrastructure contracts, debt relief, assistance in public health and
agriculture, offering zero-tariff treatment for some African exports to China,
and building schools. All these are warmly welcomed by the governments and the
ordinary people. ‘China has pledged to set up three to five special economic
zones, and institute a $5 billion development fund to encourage Chinese
investments in Africa. Moreover, 100 new schools will be built, 16,000
professionals will be trained.’(Meidan, 2006:70).
However, my reservation concerns the
non-inference policy, which has almost become the label of Chinese foreign
policy. The core of the Five Principle of Coexistence, being the
foundation of China’s diplomacy, is mutual respect and non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs. Although to urge the counterpart to change would not
be at the cost of the commercial benefits and bilateral friendships. By
offering alternative channel of economic and diplomacy, China’s participation
does weaken the leverage of others trying to promote greater respect for human
rights. Explanations, such that China itself has human rights problems so that
China has no right to accuse other countries, or that every country has
different understanding over human rights, could not satisfy the Western
public. Conversely, as China’s influence in the international community
increases, it is inappropriate to continue the non-interference policy, and
more importantly, this is not accordance to the image of ‘a responsible state’
that China wants to shape. Therefore, Chinese authority may have to take some
actions to win the acceptance of the international community in some scenarios.
Table 1
only 13 African countries receiving Chinese aid in the 1960s
|
Country
|
Date of first aid agreement
|
Amount (US$ million)
|
|
Algeria
|
1958
|
100
|
|
Egypt
|
1958
|
193
|
|
Ghana
|
1961
|
81
|
|
Mali
|
1961
|
148
|
|
Somali
|
1963
|
220
|
|
Tanzania
|
1964
|
534
|
|
Kenya
|
1964
|
91
|
|
Burundi
|
1964
|
125
|
|
CAR
|
1964
|
56
|
|
Congo
|
1964
|
205
|
|
Uganda
|
1965
|
77
|
|
Mauritania
|
1967
|
239
|
|
Zambia
|
1967
|
372
|
30
countries receiving Chinese aid in the 1970s
|
Country
|
Date of first aid agreement
|
Amount (US$ million)
|
|
Sudan
|
1970
|
230
|
|
Equat.Guinea
|
1971
|
18.7
|
|
Ethiopia
|
1971
|
155
|
|
Guinea
|
1971
|
161
|
|
Sierra Leone
|
1971
|
94
|
|
Togo
|
1972
|
77
|
|
Tunisia
|
1972
|
97
|
|
Benin
|
1972
|
72
|
|
Mauritius
|
1972
|
48
|
|
Nigeria
|
1972
|
3
|
|
Rwanda
|
1972
|
56
|
|
Burkina Faso
|
1973
|
92
|
|
Cameroon
|
1973
|
124
|
|
Chad
|
1973
|
77
|
|
Senegal
|
1973
|
108
|
|
Niger
|
1974
|
64.7
|
|
Gabon
|
1975
|
26
|
|
The Gambia
|
1975
|
36
|
|
Guinea-Bissau
|
1975
|
18
|
|
Mozambique
|
1975
|
116
|
|
Sao Tme-Prcp
|
1975
|
12
|
|
Botswana
|
1976
|
19.4
|
|
Comoros
|
1976
|
10.3
|
|
Morocco
|
1976
|
32
|
|
Cape Verde
|
1977
|
17.6
|
|
Liberia
|
1977
|
37.4
|
|
Seychelles
|
1978
|
8.1
|
|
Djibouti
|
1979
|
12.9
|
(Sources
from Brautigam Deborah, 1998, Chinese Aid and African Development, P45)
Table 2:
some commercial deals of China’s three largest oil companies in Africa
|
CNPC
|
Since 1996, CNPC has controlled a 40% stake in the Greater Nile
Petroleum Operating Company in Sudan; in 2003, CNPC purchased oil refineries
in Algeria for 350 million USD and signed an exploration deal fro oil in two
blocks; in 2004, CNPC invested 1 million USD in an oil and gas exploration
project in Mauritania; in 2006, CNPC and Sinopec teamed up to exploit newly
discovered drilling rights to an oilfield in Sudan in a deal worth about 600
million USD.
|
|
Sinopec
|
In 2002, Sinopec signed a contract for 525 million USD to develop
oil field in Algeria; in 2004, Sinopec signed a technical evaluation deal for
three onshore oilfields in Gabon to supply China with crude oil; in 2005,
Sinopec purchased a 27% stake in an oil field off the coast in Nigeria; in
2006, Sinopec entered into a joint venture partnership with a local oil
company to build an oil refinery in Angola; in 2006, Sinopec has been
constructing a 1,500km pipeline to Port Sudan.
|
|
CNOOC
|
In 2005, CNOOC paid 2.3 billion dollar for a stake in the Akpo
offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria; In 2006, CNOOC signed a
production-sharing contract in Equatorial Guinea; and bought a 45% stake in a
Nigeria oil and gas field for 2.3 billion USD; also in 2006, CNOOC was
allowed to explore in six blocks covering 44500 sq miles in Kenya;
|
(Sources:
Naidu & Davies, ‘China Fuels its Future with Africa’s Riches’;
Scott-Meuser, ‘Fuelling Development: China and Africa’; Meidan Michal, China’s
Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later)
Table 3
China’s imported crude oil by region 1995-2006(%)
|
Regions
|
1995
|
2000
|
2003
|
2006
|
|
Middle East
|
46
|
53.6
|
51.3
|
45
|
|
Africa
|
11
|
24.0
|
24.4
|
32
|
|
Asia-Pacific
|
41
|
15.0
|
15.3
|
8
|
|
Others
|
2
|
6.7
|
9.4
|
15
|
(Sources:
Lai, 2007, ‘China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It a Global Security Threat?’, P522,
cited from Yearbook of China’s Economic Foreign Relations and Trade, 2002,
2003; Zhao, 2007, China-US Oil Rivalry in Africa.)
Table
4 Projections for China’s Commodity
Import Demand
|
Commodity
|
Unit
|
Latest Demand
|
Predicted Demand in 2020
|
|
Iron ore
|
m tons
|
148
|
710
|
|
Oil
|
m tons
|
91
|
1861
|
|
Soy
|
m tons
|
26
|
50
|
|
Coal
|
m tons
|
11
|
810
|
|
Copper
|
m tons
|
3
|
20
|
|
Manganese
|
m tons
|
3
|
13
|
|
Meat
|
m tons
|
0.3
|
4
|
|
Wood
|
m cubic
|
34
|
150
|
(Sources:
Deutsche Bank Research Report)
Table 5
China’s trade volume with the world and with the Africa (billion USD)
|
Year
|
Total
trade volume
|
Trade
with Africa
|
Weight
|
|
2007
|
21738.3
|
733.11
|
3.4%
|
|
2006
|
17606.9
|
554.64
|
3.2%
|
|
2005
|
14221.2
|
397.4
|
2.8%
|
|
2000
|
4743
|
10
|
0.2%
|
(Source:
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China)
Table 6
China’s exports to the world and to the Africa (billion USD)
|
Year
|
2001
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
|
Exports volume to Africa
|
60.1
|
138.2
|
186.8
|
266.9
|
372.9
|
|
Total Exports
|
2661.55
|
5933.7
|
7620
|
9690.7
|
12180.1
|
|
Percentage
|
2.2
|
2.3
|
2.5
|
2.8
|
3.1
|
(Source:
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,
2006
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment)
References:
Africa-China: Beijing
Summit, African Research Bulletin, 2006, Vol 43, No.12, Oct 16th—Nov
15th, 2006
Africa-China: Hu’s
Tour, African Research Bulletin, 2007, Vol 44, No.1, Jan 16th-Feb
15th 2007.
Brautigam
Deborah.(1998), Chinese Aid and African Development, Published in Great
Britain.
China-Africa Friendship
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Lai Hongyi Harry
(2007), ‘China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It a Global Security Threat?’, Third
World Quarterly, Vol.28, No.3, 2007, P519-537
Lafargue
Francois(2005), China’s Presence in Africa, China Perspective
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2007, P69-93
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Davies Martyn(2006), China Fuels Its Future With Africa’s Riches,
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2006
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment
The eight are: 1. Chinese government have persistently
been providing assistance to foreign countries according to the principles of
equality and mutual benefit, never regard the assistance as the grant by one
sided……. 2. While providing foreign aid, Chinese government strictly respects
the sovereignty of recipient countries, no strings attached and no privilege
required. 3. in order to relief the burden of recipient countries, Chinese
government provides economic aids in the way of interest free or low interest
loan, the time limit of repayment could be delayed when it is needed. 4. The
purpose of Chinese government providing foreign aid is not to make recipient
countries being dependent on China, but to help recipient countries gradually
develop on the track of self reliance and economic development independently.
5. For the projects constructed through China foreign aids,
Chinese government does its best to make quick effects through smack
investment. Thus, the governments of recipient countries could increase income
and accumulate money. 6. Chinese government provides equipment and materials
made in China with the best quality, and negotiate the price in accordance with
the price of international market….7. While providing technical assistance,
Chinese government assures to teach recipients to fully master this kind of
technology. 8. The experts who are dispatched by Chinese government to help
recipient countries carrying out construction, should be paid as same as their
own experts of recipient countries. They are required to not have any special
requirement and enjoyment.
(Gountin:11-12).
The Four Principles
include: 1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African
countries, China abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and
mutual benefit, respects their sovereignty, does not interfere in their
internal affairs, attaches no political conditions and asks for no privileges
whatsoever. 2. In China’s economic and technological cooperation with African
countries, full play will be given to the strong points and potentials of both
sides on the basis of their actual needs and possibilities, and efforts
will be made to achieve good economic results with less investment, shorter
construction cycle and quicker returns. 3. China’s economic and
technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of forms
suited to the specific conditions, such as offering technical services, training
technical and management personnel, engaging in scientific and technological
exchanges, undertaking construction projects, entering into cooperative
production and joint ventures. ……4. The purpose of China’s economic and
technological cooperation with African countries is to contribute to the
enhancement of the self- reliant capabilities of both sides and promote the
growth of the respective national economies by complementing and helping each
other.(Brautigam, 1998:49-50).
